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This thesis addresses the question: what sorts of beings can have moral status that 
demands direct duties? It argues for a position that all animals have moral status 
equal to humans, and this dictates how we should behave toward them. This 
position must be defended against an anthropocentric position. The arguments 
from marginal cases propounded by Peter Singer and Tom Regan ascribe the 
same moral status to our fellow animals, which are sentient or subjects-of-a-life. 
Singer’s view is criticized as defective and a different argument is proposed that 
goes beyond utilitarianism. Beings, which are neither sentient nor subjects-of-a-
life, fall within the moral boundary, although they may not have the moral status 
of the latter. This position is related to that of Aldo Leopold and J Baird. Callicott, 
but rejects their assumption of equal inherent value for all entities. It argues 
instead for the deontological importance of preserving natural environment for 
sentient beings/subjects-of-a-life. 
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Who or what sorts of beings can have moral standing, to whom or what 
do we have direct duties? Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair, TP PTby J.Baird 
Callicott, considers the debate on this question. As J.Baird Callicott observes, 
“The presently booming controversy”TP 1PT is between Anthropocentrism (he calls 
anthropocentrism ‘Ethical Humanism’), which claims that the class of humans 
are the only member of beings with full moral standing,and Animal welfarism 
(he calls animal welfarism ‘Humane Moralism’) which includes all sentient 
beings in the class.TP PT 
According to Callicott, both anthropocentrism and animal welfarism are 
individualistic and inadequate to environmental ethics, because moral standing 
is attributed to individual humans, all and only, or individual sentient beings, 
some or all. Pitting these two rival approaches to ethics against Leopold’s land 
ethic, Callicott adopts the triangular affair, which locates the ultimate value in 
                                                 
TP
1
PT . Having emerged as a sub-discipline of philosophy, environmental ethics inquires 
into how we ought to act towards the environment, together with providing 
defensible reasons for believing what we should do in these matters. This inquiry 
typically revolves around a core of key questions: What is our moral relationship to 
the members of our own species? Are we justified in extending moral standing beyond 
the limits of our own species? What sorts of beings have inherent value, and how 
much standing these beings are owed? J.Baird Callicott tries to answer these questions 
in his famous article “Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair”, in Planet in Peril, ed., 
Dale Westphal and Fred Westphal, (Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace 1994), pp. 224-27. 
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the biotic community, and assigns differential moral standing to the 
constitutive individuals relative to that standard. While Callicott  grants a 
variety of environmental ethics may exist, they must at least give three 
competing answers to the question of what sorts of being have moral standing. 
In the first place, anthropocentrists claim that  only human beings have 
moral standing, and they are the only beings to whom we have direct duties.  
Immanuel Kant asserts that, on the one hand, only rational beings deserve 
direct moral standing, on the other hand, we can have indirect duties to non-
rational beings. As he argues, “we must not treat animals in ways that will lead 
us to mistreat human beings”.TP2PT It follows that harming and being cruel to 
animals are unethical. Nevertheless, this is not because of the harm it caused 
animals. Rather it is because the committing of such harm would “brutalize” 
humans and make them more likely subsequently to harm other people. That is 
to say, a being which lacks rationality does not have moral standing and can be 
used as mere means to an end, that end being a rational human’s survival and 
interests. 
Other Kantian-type theories argue that if a being is able to speak, or 
reason, or is self-aware, then he has moral standing. It follows that only human 
beings satisfy these criteria, but nonhumans do not. Hence, the welfare of other 
non-human creatures matters only if they are useful to humans.  
                                                 
TP
2
PT . Tom Regan, “Animal Rights, Human Wrongs”, in Planet in Peril: Essays in 
Environmental Ethics, ed., Dale Westphal and Fred Westphal, (Harcourt Brace College: 
USA 1994) P.202. 
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As opposed to Kantianism, Peter Singer and Tom Regan claim that we 
have direct duties to at least some animals, who are like some humans i.e. 
babies and the insane persons who lack autonomy and cannot will to fulfill 
their desires.  
Peter Singer, a spokesperson for animal rights, argues in his famous 
book, Animal Liberation, the anthropocentric privileging of members of the 
species ‘THomo sapiens’T is arbitrary, and that it is a kind of “speciesism” as 
unjustifiable as sexism and racism. According to him, it is “speciesist” to 
exclude sentient beings from moral consideration. In his estimation, the 
capacity to suffer remains the best criterion for giving moral consideration to 
animals. However, Singer, following Bentham’s  utilitarianism, attributes 
intrinsic value to the experience of pleasure or interest satisfaction as such, not 
to the beings who have the experience.  It is unclear to what extent a utilitarian 
ethic can also be an environmental ethic.  
In contrast,Tom Regan extends Kantian human rights ethics to animal 
rights ethics. Beings with inherent value have moral rights not to be treated in 
certain ways. Instead of utilitarian considerations, rights should be based on 
the value of individuals. His case rests on lines of argument with respect to the 
case of animals that are subjects-of-a-life, which is better or worse for them, 
independently of whether they are valued by anyone else.  Their rights should 
not be overridden for our mere benefits without justification. The fact that 
animals themselves cannot speak out on their own behalf does not weaken our 
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obligation to act on their behalf; rather, we are obligated not to harm their 
living environment, necessary for their flourishing.  
A third view is the so-called holistic viewpoint of nature, according to 
which moral standing or rights are conferred on the environment as a whole. 
For most environmentalists, Aldo Leopold’s Land Ethic is one of the superb 
examples of the holistic environmental ethics. As Leopold argues, “The land 
ethic... simply enlarges the boundaries of the community to include soils, 
waters, plants, and animals, or collectively, the land”.TP3P       For Leopold, the land as 
an ecological system has an ‘integrity’ of its own that should not be harmed or 
damaged. Each and every member of the land community is equal. No one has 
priority over other members of the land community. Individual humans are 
subordinated to promote the integrity of the land community beyond their self-
interests.  If an individual promotes the best integrity of the biotic community, 
then that individual has value, otherwise not.  
Which one of the above three views on the moral standing of beings is 
correct? If we believe that only humans count, we will not voice strong 
objections to painful animal experiments that benefit humankind. But if we 
believe that all sentient beings have equal moral standing, then we will 
demand that the welfare of animals be taken into account. Although it is 
consistent with utilitarianism that animals be given moral consideration, this is 
                                                 
3. Aldo Leopold, “The Land Ethic” in Earth Ethics: Environmental Ethics, Animal Rights 
and Practical Applications ed., James P. Sterba, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall 1995) p. 
147. 
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not because they have rights, and animals can sometimes be used for human 
purposes. That is to say, for a utilitarian, it is hard to protect animals from 
painful experiments or industrial uses for human’s purposes. Finally, if we 
accept the environment as a whole is valuable in itself, we can see that 
individual humans or animals or even plants are disvalued if they do not 
promote the integrity of the biotic community. In this case, while humans do 
not have the priority over other members of the community, it is not 
conceivable that to whom has the responsibility to promote the integrity of the 
system beyond their interests.  Plants, landscape, rivers etc cannot care of the 
community rather than animals. However, sometimes, we may require 
individual animals culling, hunting and predating to keep the land healthy.  
Thus, the land ethic’s defining goal, that valuable in itself seems to lack the 
holistic web. 
In my view, nothing but animal rights matters most in the deontological 
perspective. A justification of this kind of position presupposes a refutation of 
utilitarian-based nonhuman animal welfarism, and of the rival holistic position 
of the land ethic. 
 








                                                                                        CHAPTER 1 
ANTHROPOCENTRIC VIEW 
 
1.1 The anthropocentric debate 
 Anthropocentrism is the view that humanity’s needs and interests are of 
supreme and exclusive value and importance in nature. By this belief, morality 
is narrowed from the human community to the single individual. Individual 
persons are the only beings endowed with freedom, rationality and the ability 
of making choices according to a life plan. Only humans have these 
characteristics to fulfill the conditions of deserving moral standing, and 
therefore rights and responsibilities are applied only to human beings. This 
belief rests on a conception of ethics deeply rooted in Western philosophy.  
One of the earliest and clearest expressions of this kind of view comes to 
us from Aristotle. According to Aristotle, the relationship between humans and 
nature is regarded as “Natural and Expedient”.TP4PT    There is a natural hierarchy 
of living beings. Only human beings, animals and plants are all capable of 
taking in nutrition and growing, while human beings and animals are capable 
of conscious experience. Plants, being inferior to animals and human beings, 
have the function of serving the needs of animals and human beings. Likewise, 
human beings are superior to animals because human beings have the capacity 
                                                 
TP
4
PT . Aristotle, “Animals and Slavery” in Animal Rights and Human Obligations (2nd ed.) 
ed., Tom Regan & Peter Singer, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall 1989) p.4. 
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for using reason to guide their conduct, while animals lack this ability and 
must instead rely on instinct. It follows, therefore, that the function of animals 
is to serve the needs of human beings. 
Following Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas argues, “The very condition of 
the rational creature, in that it has dominion over its actions, requires that the 
care of providence should be bestowed on it for its own sake”.TP5PT   According to 
him, only beings, which are rational, are capable of determining their actions; 
they are the only beings towards which we should extend concern for their 
own sakes.  Aquinas believes that if a being cannot direct its own actions then 
others must do so; these sorts of beings are merely instruments. Instruments 
exist for the sake of people that use them, not for their own sakes. Since 
animals cannot direct their own actions, they are merely instruments and exist 
for the sake of the human beings that direct their actions. Aquinas believes that 
his view follows from the fact that God is the final end of the universe, and that 
it is only by using the human intellect that one can gain knowledge and 
understanding of God. Since only human beings are capable of achieving this 
final end, all other beings exist for the sake of human beings and their 
achievement of knowledge of God, who is the final end of the universe.  
The Western traditional religion, Christianity, endorses this kind of view 
based on God’s words in “Genesis”. This account of the Western religious 
                                                 
TP
5
PT . Saint Thomas Aquinas, “On Killing Living Things, and the Duty to Irrational 
Creatures” in Singer and Regan, Animal Rights and Human Obligations, p. 6. 
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approach to Humanity’s place in nature can be seen in Lynn White Jr.’s famous 
article, The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis. According to his 
interpretation of the verse in the Genesis, “So God created man in his own 
image…blessed them…and God said…have dominion over the fish of the sea 
and over the fowl in the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the 
earth”.P6PT  Man alone is created in God’s image, and man alone is given 
dominion over all the animals on earth.   And all other animals, plants, and the 
environment are at the mercy of man for their full utilization.  There is little 
acknowledgment in this tradition of the limits of humankind’s capacity to 
manage the earth exclusively for his own use; and since God ordains all beings, 
man should not interfere with nature unnecessarily.  
Humans are associated with only “God-given” ethical belief. If humans 
are associated with their self-made ethical life, they can be rescued in God-
given belief. Therefore, a direct consequence of this ethical view is that we do 
not require any further moral justification. Closely related to the religious view, 




                                                 
TP
6
PT . Lynn White Jr. “The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis”, in This Sacred Earth: 
Religion, Nature, Environment, ed., Roger S. Gottlieb (London and New York: Routledge 
1996) p. 189 
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1. Only human beings have moral standing or rights 
 Immanuel Kant is considered one of the great philosophical thinkers of 
all time, who insisted that only rational beings have direct moral standing. 
According to Kant, “Rational beings are ends-in-themselves, and must never be 
used as mere means”. TP7PT A rational being has moral worth, and those who have 
rationality cannot be used for some other ends.  This means that ‘being 
rational’ is the criterion of having direct moral standing, but ‘being non-
rational’ can have at best indirect moral standing.  
According to Kant, a rational being is endowed with freedom, 
rationality and the ability of making choices according to his life plan, and 
therefore he has inherent worth since he has a goal worth seeking in himself. If 
only a rationally good will might have inherent value, only a particular 
creature has that value. Kant assumes that only rational beings are capable of 
self-valuing because they possess a rational and free will. Certainly, only 
rational beings are capable of  realizing that others value themselves as one 
values oneself -- to wit, intrinsically.  
On the other hand, non-rational beings, e.g. animals are not self-
conscious and are there merely as a means to an end. That end is man.  
Animals are not self-conscious or rational, so they have no independent moral 
                                                 
TP
7
PT . Immanuel Kant, “Rational Beings Alone Have Moral Worth”, in Environmental 
Ethics: Readings in Theory and Application, (2PndP ed.), ed., Louis P. Pojman (London and 
New York: Routledge, 1993) p.33 
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value. Our duties towards non-humans are merely indirect duties towards 
humanity. They exist merely as means to our ends.  However, this assumption 
emphasizes that animals do not deserve moral consideration in themselves. 
This does not mean that we can treat animals in any way we choose. Our 
behavior towards animals is analogous to our behavior towards other humans, 
we must treat them with due respect.  We might put this in terms of the 
distinction between a duty to something and a duty regarding something.  That 
is, we have no duties to animals, but we have duties regarding (our behavior 
towards) animals. Indirectly, our duty to animals, according to Kant, is to 
“Refrain from harming and being cruel to them”. TP8PT We should so refrain 
because such acts will tend to lead to a mistreatment of human beings. 
Therefore, in Kant’s account, the moral link between man and animal may 
stand, as people who treat animals by kicking a cat or shooting a dog, may 
develop a habit, which in time, inclines them to treat humans similarly.  
However, is ‘rationality’ the only morally relevant property that confers 
equal moral status to human beings? Different Kantian believers have 




                                                 
TP
8
PT . Tom Regan, “Animal Rights, Human Wrongs” p. 202 
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2. Only humans have the capacity to use language, and the capacity to reason 
  Another reason to deny that animals deserve direct concern arises 
from the belief of “consciousness”. Like Kant, Rene Descartes believed that 
animals are not conscious because they lack “the capacity to speak and to 
think”. TP9PT According to him, a soul is the necessary condition for conscious 
experiences. Humans possess souls while animals do not. Nevertheless, he 
believes that animals experience something from their behavior. Animals use 
gestures for something, but this does not prove they have consciousness as 
humans do. Descartes gives two reasons for the priority of human 
consciousness.  
First, human beings are capable of complex and novel behavior. This 
behavior is not the result of simple responses to stimuli, but is instead the 
result of our reasoning about the world, as we perceive it. Second, human 
beings are capable of the kind of speech that expresses thoughts.  
Relying on these two reasons, Descartes argues that it is not the want of 
organs that brings this to pass, for it is evident that magpies and parrots are 
able to utter words just like ourselves, and yet they cannot speak as we do, that 
is, so as to give evidence that they think. Descartes was aware that some 
animals make sounds that might be thought to constitute speech, such as a 
parrot’s ‘request’ for food, but argued that these utterances are mere 
                                                 
TP
9
PT . Rene Descartes, “Animals are Machines” in Animal Rights and Human Obligations, 
pp.13-19 
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mechanically induced behaviors. Only human beings can engage in the kind of 
speech that is spontaneous and expresses thoughts. 
3. Only those with higher order thoughts have moral standing 
 The capacity of animals to use language and the capacity to think is not 
anything like the capacity that humans have. Like Descartes, Peter Carruthers 
has explicitly applied his functionalist “Higher-order Thoughts”TP10PT theory of 
phenomenal consciousness to derive a negative conclusion about animal 
consciousness. According to Carruthers, a higher-order thought is a thought 
that can take as its object another thought. Moreover, a mental state is 
conscious for a subject just in case it is available to be thought about directly by 
that thought. Furthermore, such higher order thoughts are not possible unless a 
creature has a ‘Theory of Mind’ to equip it with the concepts necessary for 
thought about mental states. Carruthers then notes that the difference between 
conscious and non-conscious experiences is that conscious experiences are 
available to higher-order thoughts while non-conscious experiences are not.  
However, we have no reason to believe that animals have higher-order 
thoughts, and thus no reason to believe that they are conscious. 
 
                                                 
TP
10
PT. Peter Carruthers, “Animals and Conscious Experience” in The Animals Issue, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1992) pp. 171-193 
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4. Only humans have Awareness, Expectation, Belief, Desire, Aim and 
Purpose 
The contemporary philosopher, Joel Feinberg, supports this position.  
He states, “Without awareness, expectation, belief, desire, aim and purpose, a 
being can have no interests”.11  According to him, the sorts of beings that can 
have rights are precisely those that can have interests. That is to say, a holder of 
rights must be capable of claiming rights and of being a beneficiary in its own 
person. However, a being or thing cannot be a beneficiary if it has no interests. 
A being without interests is incapable of being benefited or harmed, since it has 
no good of its own. Only humans possess these special qualities. Since animals 
lack these qualities, they have no good of their own. 
Thus, anthropocentrism or ‘human chauvinism’ is the idea that we 
humans are the crown of creation, the source of all value, and the measure of 
all things, which have deeply been embedded in our rationality, autonomy and 
consciousness.  Animals may be used for our own purposes since there is no 
ethical prohibition on the justifiable infliction of pain, suffering and perhaps 
even death on animals. In addition, lacking in rationality, deliberative 
consciousness or being incapable of using language, non-human animals are 
different from humans, and do not deserve equal consideration with us.  
                                                 
TP
11
PT . Joel Feinberg, “The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations”, in Responsibilities 
to Future Generations: Environmental Ethics, ed., Ernest Partridge, (Buffalo, N.Y.: 
Prometheus 1980) p. 147. 
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 Some philosophers, as opposed to Kantianism, have extended moral 
consideration to both humans and nonhuman animals. For example, James 
Rachels has labeled as “Human Speciesists” those who believe that being 
human in and of itself confers greater moral considerability than being 
members of other species. According to him, “Speciesism” takes two forms, 
‘Qualified’ and ‘Unqualified’. The qualified speciesism might believe that 
humans have a special moral category because they are rational, autonomous 
agents. The unqualified speciesism believes that mere species membership 
alone is morally relevant to qualified speciesists. As Rachels put, “The bare fact 
that an individual is a member of a certain species, unsupplemented by any 
other consideration, is enough to make a difference in how that individual 
should be treated”.TP12PT  Unqualified speciesism is not a very plausible way of 
understanding the relation between species and morality. For example, 
suppose, more than a half century ago, “The Teacher from Mars” had come to 
earth to teach in a school for children, and the Mars teacher was ‘different’ in 
some characteristics from the schoolboys, such as seven feet tall, thin, with 
tentacles and leathery skin. Suppose that except for the different kind of body, 
the Mars teacher was exactly like a human, equally intelligent, sensitive, and 
had the same interests as anyone else. Giving the Martian‘s interests less 
weight than those of humans would be unjustified discrimination. Since 
                                                 
TP
12
PT . James Rachels, “Darwin, Species, and Morality” in Animal Rights and Human 
Obligations, pp.95-96. 
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unqualified speciesism and racism are twin doctrines, they are morally 
unjustifiable for the same sorts of reasons.   
As Rachels argues, “The progression from family to neighbor to species 
passes through other boundaries on the way – through the boundary of race, 
for example. Suppose it were suggested that we are justified in giving the 
interests of our own race greater weight than the interests of other races? 
(Blacks, too, it might be said, could not then be criticized for putting other 
blacks first.) This would rightly be UresistedU, but the case for distinguishing by 
species alone is little better”.TP13PT In Rachels’ arguments, the claim that human 
beings do have greater value, and therefore deserve greater moral standing 
than members of other species, must be based on their having a morally 
relevant property. Therefore, for Rachels, qualified speciesists can treat 
members of other species differently since they lack same morally relevant 
property.  
In Rachels’ arguments, we should note that species-membership is 
correlated with other differences. However, he did not go beyond his own 
species. In one sense, any human outlook is necessarily anthropocentric, since 
we can apprehend the world only through our own senses and conceptual 
categories.  
If anthropocentrists’ commitment to the claim is that only human 
beings, based on the morally relevant property, deserve greater moral standing 
                                                 
TP
13
PT . Ibid, p.97 
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than members of other species, do UallU and UanyU humans possess the same? This 
question pertains to the so-called “marginal humans” in the sense of human 
beings who are not moral persons. Again, can we apprehend our morality from 
a nonhuman point of view? According to the qualified speciesists, of course, 
we cannot. The question is, rather, should we extend moral consideration to 
nonhuman animals?  The question, of course, is entirely open. Many qualified 
speciesists have done a lot in this field. 
 Scott Wilson, for example, attacks those who argue that only moral 
persons deserve direct moral standing. Instead, he argues that the marginal 
case of humans justify the case to extend moral consideration to animals. As he 
argues,  “If animals do not have direct moral standing, and then neither do 
such human beings as infants, the senile, the severely cognitively disabled, and 
other such marginal casesTP PTof humanity”.TP14PT  According to him, we believe that 
these sorts of human beings do have direct moral standing, and there must be 
something wrong with any theory that claims they do not. More formally, the 
argument is structured as follows: 
(1) If we are justified in denying direct moral standing to animals then we are 
justified in denying direct moral standing to the marginal cases of humans. 
(2) We are not justified in denying direct moral standing to the marginal cases. 
(3) Therefore, we are not justified denying direct moral standing to animals. 
                                                 
TP
14




If being rational, autonomous, exercising reciprocity, being self-aware or 
being able to speak are such properties that permit us to deny direct moral 
standing to animals, and we can likewise deny that standing to any human 
lacking those properties. This line of reasoning for almost every property 
warrants us to deny direct moral standing to animals. Wilson further argues, 
since the marginal cases are beings whose abilities are equal to, if not less than, 
the abilities of animals, any reason to keep animals out of the class of beings 












1.2 Nonhuman’s position in Utilitarian based perspectives 
In any serious exploration of nonhuman animal moral standing, a central issue 
is whether there is anything of intrinsic value beyond human beings. Peter 
Singer has been the most influential in the debate concerning nonhuman moral 
consideration. However, Singer finds his moral principles in utilitarianism. 
According to utilitarianism, the rightness or wrongness of an act depends on its 
consequences, and we should choose the action which maximizes what is 
considered good. For Bentham, happiness is the ultimate good. For Singer, the 
satisfaction of preferences is the ultimate good. We shall discuss Singer’s views 
on the following issues:  
(1) Speciesism and the idea of equality 
(2) “Sentience” is the basis of human and animal equality 
(3) Practical implications 
(4)The principle of equal consideration applied to Vegetarianism 
1. Speciesism and the idea of equality  
Right from the beginning, Singer develops the idea of “equality.”  
“Equality”, for Singer, is a moral idea, not an assertion of fact. The claim that 
“all humans are equal” does not assert that they are in fact equal in intelligence, 
capabilities, size, etc. Rather, we assert that they deserve equal consideration of 
interests. 
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Singer quotes from Bentham’s account of moral consideration, “Each to 
count for one and none more than one”.P15PT In other words, the interests of every 
being affected by an action are to be taken into account and given the same 
weight as the like interests of any other being. In an ethical judgment, we must 
accept that our interests do not count more than the similar interests of anyone 
else do. This requires that we treat equally the like interests of every being 
capable of having interests. That applies not only to humans but also to 
animals.  
The equal consideration of interests, according Singer, does not imply an 
identical treatment to both humans and animals. As he argues, “The basic 
principles of equality does not require identical or equal treatment; it requires 
equal consideration. Equal consideration for different beings may lead to 
different treatment and different rights”.TP16PT  According to Singer, if we look 
carefully at the principles for demanding equality for women, racial groups 
and other oppressed human groups, we would see that those principles must 
apply to non-human beings as well. When we agree that racism and sexism are 
wrong and demand equality for all humans, we do not deny the massive 
differences, in all sorts of ways, between humans: in size, shape, color, 
experience and feelings. If we wanted to demand equality for all humans on, 
say, a physical basis we would soon realize that such equality was impossible. 
                                                 
TP
15
PT . Peter Singer, “Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals”, 
(New York:  Random House 1975) p 6. 
TP
16
PT . Ibid., p 3 
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The fact that a person is black, or a woman, cannot lead us to any conclusion 
about that person’s moral or intellectual capacity. Therefore, a claim by a white 
racist that white people are morally superior to black people is clearly wrong.  
Logically the same reasoning for equality will have to apply to animals.  
Singer introduces the word “Tspeciesism”T TP17PT Tto describe a Tprejudice, or 
bias in favor of the interests of one’s own species against those of members of 
other species. Speciesism is just another form of discrimination such as racism 
or sexism based upon an arbitrary difference. Speciesism is what we are guilty 
of when, according to Peter Singer, we offer less than equality of consideration 
to members of other species - in the same way that we might be guilty of 
racism. For instance, the racist violates the principle of equality by giving 
greater weight to the interests of members of his own race, the sexist of his own 
sex, and similarly, the speciesist allows the interests of his own species to over-
ride the greater interests of members of other species.  If possessing a higher 
degree of intelligence does not entitle one human to use another for his own 
ends, how can it entitle humans to exploit nonhumans for the same purpose?  
However, how does Singer recognize that the principle of equality applies to 
members of other species as well as to our own? According to Singer, our 
moral justification should at least take such a property e.g. sentience, which 
brings beings into our moral circle regardless of their sex, race, species etc. 
Singer argues that we have to choose a property that all and any human beings 
                                                 
TP
17
PT . Ibid., p, 7 
 21
do have, such as “being sentient”, and if some animals also have this property, 
then that is sufficient for them to have an equal moral standing to us.  
2. Sentience as the basis of human and animal equality 
Singer equates sentience with “the capacity to suffer - to feel pain”.TP PTTP18PT It  
is the ‘vital characteristic’ to qualify a being for the right of equal consideration; 
and the capacity to suffer takes precedence over any ability to reason (think 
rationally), or speak etc.  Hence, the capacity for suffering and enjoying things 
is a pre-requisite for having interests at all. And sentience is a property, which 
is had by all and any human and most nonhuman animals. 
Singer quotes from Bentham’s account of how to treat nonhuman 
animals. As Bentham wrote, “It may one day come to be recognized that the 
number of the legs, the velocity of the skin or the termination of the sacrum are 
reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. 
What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, 
or perhaps the faculty of discourse? However, a full-grown horse or dog is 
beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than 
an infant of a day or a week or even a month, old. However, suppose they were 
otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, Can they reason? Nor can 
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they talk? But, Can they suffer?”TP19PT In this passage, Singer points out mainly 
two reasons in favor of bringing nonhumans into our moral circle.  
The first is that the capacity for suffering is the vital characteristic that 
gives a being the right to equal consideration. Therefore we must consider the 
interests of all beings with capacity for suffering or enjoyment; and in this 
sense, Bentham does not arbitrarily exclude from consideration any interests at 
all- as those who draw the line with reference to the possession of reason or 
language do. Hence, the capacity for suffering or enjoyment is a prerequisite 
for having interests at all. 
The second reason relates to how we know that animals feel pain.  
Singer offers two arguments: the first is that the central nervous systems of 
vertebrates are essentially alike to ours; the second is that sentience gives an 
animal an advantage in survival. That is why the sole attribution of sentience to 
humans is highly unlikely.  
Some can claim that some lower animals e.g. shrimps, fish, ants, insects 
etc may be said to have a life without consciousness. Do these beings feel pain?  
Singer argues that claims that these manifest pain sensation have not been 
substantiated and those beings do not have a central nervous system similar to 
higher animals as we. And so they may not have sentience. According to 
Singer, “the limit of sentience (using the term as a convenient if not strictly 
accurate shorthand for the capacity to suffer and / or experience enjoyment) is 
                                                 
TP
19
PT . Ibid., p 8 
 23
the only defensible boundary of concern for the interests of others”.TP20PT  A being, 
which is not sentient, has no interests to be taken into account, and it cannot be 
included into our moral circle. For example, if someone kicks a stone, he is not 
acting immorally (unless he kicks it at someone, perhaps) since the stone has no 
interest in not being kicked but if he kicks a dog, the situation is quite different. 
Since the dog has the capacity to feel pain or pleasure, it can have interests, and 
would be included into our moral circle. This means that all sorts of non-
human animals, which are sentient, are admitted into the moral circle. There is 
no moral reason for denying moral consideration to a being that suffers. And 
equal consideration demands that the suffering of one being be counted 
equally with the like suffering of another being.  
One problem in thinking about animal sentience is that when we think 
of animals we tend to think of certain sorts of animals, namely, higher animals 
(cows, dogs, veal calves, rats etc). These are clearly sentient. But what about 
other species? Is an oyster sentient? The metaphor of the moral circle implies 
that there is a sharp boundary between those animals, which are sentient, and 
those, which are not. However, where does the boundary lie? According to 
Singer, If not all animals suffer, then “the line between sentient and non-
sentient animals may be drawn somewhere between shrimps and oysters”. TP21PT 
This follows that Singer explicitly argues against broadening the class of beings 
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with moral status beyond sentient beings. Non-sentient objects in the 
environment such as plant species, and ecosystems, are of no intrinsic but at 
most instrumental value to the satisfaction of sentient beings.   Nonsentient 
entities lack conscious desires, and therefore they do not have a good of their 
own. At best, they have some value if they are useful to individuals.   
3. Practical implications 
 It seems that Singer’s view is clearly sympathetic to taking animals into 
our moral circle, whether or not we adopt a utilitarian point of view.  From the 
utilitarian perspective, one can assume that the principle of equal consideration 
of interests requires that we must be able to determine the interests of the 
beings that will be affected by our actions, and we must give similar interest 
similar weight.  
Since animals can experience pain and suffering, they can have an 
interest in avoiding pain. If we do not consider avoiding animal pain, our 
actions would be unjustifiable. Human speciesists do not admit that pain is as 
bad when felt by cows or rats, as it is when human beings feel it. However, 
according to Singer’s view, “One must consider all the animal suffering 
involved and all the human benefit, such that under given circumstances, for a 
large human benefit an animal experiment would be justifiable”.TP22PT  
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For instance, in an experiment on rats in the hope of finding a cure for 
cancer, Singer would weigh the potential benefits of the research in terms of the 
alleviation of suffering of cancer against the suffering caused to the rats. That 
means, if the experiment would alleviate more suffering than the suffering of 
the rat, it would be a good to perform it.  Hence, we will sometimes be morally 
justified in experimenting in favor of human’s interests of alleviating suffering. 
It is noted that Singer’s ethic focuses on the consequences of an action (in terms 
of the alleviation of suffering or creation of happiness). It is therefore a form of 
consequentialism. 
However, Singer permits animal research if it satisfies greater human 
benefit. For Singer, most of the scientific experiments do not have good results; 
the researchers seek for human benefit by experimenting on animals 
unnecessarily. Some animals are self-conscious, and they have forward-looking 
desires. The desires of self-conscious beings are not replaceable.  Singer puts 
forth that by refraining from experimenting with self-conscious animals 
because   of their capacity for meaningful relations with others is not relevant 
to the question of inflicting pain. Beyond the capacity to feel pain, self-
conscious beings may have the capacity of planning future, complex acts of 
communication and so on. According to Singer, it is not arbitrary to hold that 
the life of a self-conscious being is more valuable than the life of a non-
conscious being. With regard to self-conscious individuals, Singer is a 
preference utilitarian rather than a hedonistic utilitarian.  He argues, “a 
preference, for saving a human life over the life of an animal when a choice has 
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to be made is a preference based on the characteristics that normal humans 
have, not on the mere fact that they are members of our own species”.TP PTTP23PT 
This demonstrates that killing a person is wrong unless this preference is 
outweighed by opposing preferences. To kill a person thwarts their preference 
for continued existence as well as their future oriented preferences. Unlike fish 
and chicken, the great apes are self-conscious, and therefore killing chicken or 
fish is preferable to the great apes. The great apes, which are self-conscious, can 
see themselves as distinct entities with a future and have preferences for the 
future.  
However, according to Singer, some “merely sentient beings”TP PT(this 
includes some animals, human infants and the severely retarded) are not self-
conscious; they do not see themselves as distinct entities existing over time, so 
they are unable to have a preference for continued existence and as a 
consequence no wrong is done if they are killed painlessly. However, this does 
not mean that Singer suggests that we kill animals painlessly. Rather, he 
suggests that equal consideration must be given to the interest of beings with 
feelings in avoiding suffering and finding comfort. And if sentient beings have 
a large stake in this, they must be given an equivalently large degree of 
consideration, but if their interest is less, so should be the consideration given 
to them. As Singer argues, “As long as we can live without inflicting suffering 
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on animals that is what we ought to do.” TP24PT If either one has the ability to lessen 
the amount of suffering humans or animals go through, that is what he or she 
should do. As a result, anyone concerned about doing what is right should stop 
perpetuating the widespread suffering of animals by ceasing to eat animal 
meat. 
Likewise, hunting for sport, using animals in rodeos, keeping animals 
confined in zoos wherein they are not able to engage in their natural activities, 
are all condemned by the use of the principle of the equal consideration of 
interests. 
4. The principle of equal consideration applied to Vegetarianism 
  Insofar as the pleasures and pains of nonhuman sentient animals are like 
those of humans, they should be taken into account when the morality of an 
action or a practice is being considered. According to Singer, “our interest in 
animal flesh is only a minor interest (people like the taste of meat) and the 
equal consideration forbids the major interests (the animals’ interest in not 
suffering) being sacrificed for a minor interest, and so eating meat in 
industrialized societies cannot be morally justifiable”.TP25PT According to Singer, 
although human beings do satisfy their interests by eating meat, the interests 
the animals have in avoiding this unimaginable pain and suffering is greater 
than the interests we have in eating food that tastes good. Becoming a 
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vegetarian is the most practical and effective step of ending both the killing and 
the infliction of suffering of animals. However, although sometimes painlessly 
killing animals for food is justified in Singer’s view, he doubts that all of these 
conditions could be met, and unequivocally claims that they are not met by 
such places as factory farms.  
Singer argues, “The factory farm is nothing more than the application of 
technology to the idea that animals are means to our ends”.TP26PT  This is due to the 
inherent cruelty of modern factory farming methods that maintain various 
practices in industry and agriculture which involve great suffering to higher 
animals and produce relatively little benefits to human beings. If we are to 
apply the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests, we will be forced to 
cease raising animals in factory farms for food. A failure to do so is nothing 
other than speciesism, or giving preference to the interests of our own species 
merely because they are of our species.  
Nevertheless, Singer suggests, “Vegetarianism brings with it a new 
relationship to food, plants, and nature”. TP27PT According to Singer, we have at 
least two reasons for being vegetarian. On the one hand, most vegetables 
contain every kind of food value, which are easy to digest and to keep our 
stomachs clear. Moreover, we take from the earth food that is ready for us and 
does not fight against us when we take it. On the other hand, animal flesh sits 
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heavily in our stomachs, blocking our digestive processes until days later we 
struggle to excrete it.  
 In conclusion, the animals themselves are incapable of demanding their 
own liberation, or of protesting against their condition with votes or 
demonstrations, but human beings have the power to make this planet suitable 
for living beings. Therefore, until we boycott animal flesh and cease to 
contribute to the continued existence, prosperity, and growth of factory 
farming that involve the cruel practices used in rearing animals for food, we 
have failed to show the sincerity of our concern for nonhuman animals.  

























                                                        CHAPTER 2 
NONHUMANS’ POSITION 
                                                 IN 
RIGHTS-BASED PERSPECTIVES 
  
2.1 Nonhumans’ position in rights-based perspectives 
An alternative moral theory to utilitarianism is a rights-based or 
deontological theory. It is a non-consequentialist moral theory. It is the theory 
which says that whether an act is right or wrong is inherent in the act itself, and 
individuals can never be treated as merely means to an end. Rather they are 
ends in themselves. This belief comes from Kantian human rights ethics. Some 
philosophers adopt this belief. For example, Tom Regan has been one of the 
most influential of them.   He has modified Kantian human rights a bit to say 
that a being, which is a subject-of-a-life, has rights. Unlike most Kantians, that 
there is no moral justification for denying moral status to beings who cannot 
bear moral responsibility.  His The Case for Animal Rights is a superb example of 
applied ethics, which gives the most plausible consideration to the issues and 
defense of animal rights. The aim of the animal rights movement is to seek the 
end of animal exploitation, to end it completely, not just to reform the details of 
our treatment of animals. We shall focus on the following aspects of his theory. 
(1)The concept of equal inherent value 
(2) Being subject-of-a-life deserves equal inherent value 
(3) Each subject-of-a-life should be treated with respect 
(4) Practical implications and the case for vegetarianism 
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1. The Concept of Equal Inherent value 
 Regan assumes that the utilitarian’s view of the value of the individual is 
inadequate to mean individual value.  Regan urges, “You and I do have value 
as individuals………. Inherent value. We have such value in the sense that we 
are something more than, something different from, mere receptacles”. TP28PT  
According to Regan, we are to be understood as being conceptually distinct 
from the intrinsic value that attaches to the experiences we have, as not being 
reducible to values of the latter kind, and as being incommensurate with these 
values. 
 According to Regan, we must believe that “all who have inherent value 
thus have it equally”,TP29PT whether they be humans or animals, regardless of their 
sex, race, religion, and birthplace and so on. It is not true that such humans, e.g. 
the retarded child, or the mentally damaged, have less inherent value than you 
or I. This criterion does not imply that those who meet it have a greater or 
lesser degree of inherent value. The inherent value of an individual is 
categorical value, admitting of no degrees. Thus, any supposed relevant 
similarity must itself be categorical. Hence, while we must recognize our equal 
inherent value, as individuals, reason--not sentiment, not emotion-- compels us 
to recognize the equal inherent value of these animals.  
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In this way, inherent value, in turn, may be the best grounds for basic 
moral rights. One’s value as an individual is independent of his usefulness to 
others. Whether inherent value belongs to others, e.g. rocks and rivers, trees 
etc, we do not know, and may never know.  Those individuals, who have 
inherent value, have a right to be treated with respect, and we have a general 
duty on our part not to harm them.  
2. Being Subject-of-a-life as the sufficient condition of having inherent value 
  Regan argues that being a subject-of-a-life is a sufficient condition for 
having inherent value. Any being that is a subject-of-a-life is a being that has 
inherent value.  What sorts of beings are candidates for subjects-of- a- life?   
According to Regan, some properties fulfill the sufficient conditions to 
be a subject-of-a-life. He claims that we must have a life that is valuable to us 
regardless of the actions of others. To be subject-of-a-life involves more than 
merely being alive and more than merely being conscious.  For instance, a 
being that is a subject-of-a-life will have “feelings, beliefs and desires; a sense of 
the future; an emotional life; preferences of welfare-interests; the ability to 
fulfill desires and goals; volitionally, they are capable of making choices; 
relative to what they believe and feel, in pursuit of what they want; a 
psychological identity over time”. TP30PT According to Regan, subjects-of-a-lives 
have three features. 
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 (1) A relevant similarity: those who are subjects-of-a-life, whether 
humans or animals, have equal inherent value, and everyone’s interest should 
be counted independently as opposed to better or worse in terms of others’ 
utility. 
 (2) A categorical value: As argued earlier, inherent value of a subject-of-
a-life is categorical value, admitting of no degrees. Any supposed relevant 
similarity must itself be categorical.  
(3)  A relevant similarity must go someway toward illuminating why we 
have direct duties to those are subjects-of-a-life, and why we have less reason 
to believe that we have indirect duties to those who are neither moral humans 
nor moral patients. Regan suggests that mammals above the age of one are 
subjects of a life.  
 There must somewhere be a sharp boundary between those animals 
which are subjects-of-a-life and those which are not. Regan responds that 
whether other living beings which are not subjects-of-a-life have rights or not is 
an open question. 
 It follows that creatures such as birds, fish etc may not be subjects-of-a-
life, but allowing their recreational or economic exploitation may encourage the 
formation of habits and practices that lead to the violation of the rights of 
animals, which are subjects-of-a-life. In addition, natural objects that are not 
subject-of-a-life have a kind of value that is not the same as the subjects-of-a-life 
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have. These entities have value since they are useful to all subjects-of-a-life. 
Nevertheless, attributing rights to the nonconscious natural objects is 
impossible.  
Thus, Regan argues that those who are subjects-of-a-life have rights; 
have a valid claim to be treated respectfully, even if they are not able to make 
those claims on their own behalf. These rights, according to Regan, are natural 
rights. Their rights are not contractually agreed upon, or voluntarily given by 
humans to other humans and animals. The rights exist because of the very 
nature of being subject-of-a-life. All subjects-of-a-life are equal rights-holders, 
none ought to violate any subject-of-a-life’s individual right, and more 
importantly, we are compelled to protect their rights from those who would 
harm them or kill them. 
 Who have this responsibility? In order to answer this question, Regan 
makes a key distinction between moral humans (note that Regan uses the term 
“moral agents”) and moral patients. Moral humans are those who are able to 
act morally e.g. normal adult humans. They behave in a moral way. On the 
other hand, moral patients are not able to make moral decisions e.g. babies, 
mentally retarded, animals, and are not accountable for what they do morally. 
Nonetheless, Regan argues, beings who are moral patients deserve moral 
standing, and they have equal moral status with normal adult humans.   
In the case for animal rights, since the animals like us in being subjects of 
a life, are routinely eaten, hunted and used in our laboratories, our duties to 
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animals therefore would be to recognize that our equal inherent value as 
individuals compels us to recognize the equal inherent value of these animals.  
3. Each Subject-of-a-life should be treated with respect 
According to Regan, human and animal rights are validated with 
respect to moral principles. Most important is justice, which is addressed 
through the Respect Principle.  Regan argues, “We are to treat those 
individuals who have inherent value in ways that respect their inherent value”. 
TP
31
PT All subjects of a life, as a matter of justice, have a basic moral right to 
respectful treatment, which recognizes their inherent value. If we are to act 
morally, animals are not at our disposal to use as we choose. Animals in 
particular, “are to be treated with respect and that respectful treatment is their 
due, as a matter of strict justice”. TP32PT We cannot use them as merely receptacles. 
We owe them due respectful treatment, not out of kindness, but because of 
justice.   According to this principle, no individual with equal inherent value 
may be treated solely as a means to an end in order to maximize the aggregate 
of desirable consequences. To harm moral patients that are subjects-of-a-life for 
the sake of aggregated human interests is wrong. It is wrong because, 
according to the rights view, it violates the principle of respect for individuals 
who fulfill the subject-of-a-life criterion.  To require just treatment of animals is 
to ask for nothing more than in the case of any human to whom justice is due.   
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The respect principle claims that each individual, whether moral agent or 
moral patient, bears equal inherent value, and therefore  should have equal 
right to be treated with respect.  
4. Practical implications and the Case for Vegetarianism 
  According to the respect principle, no innocent individual should 
be harmed. If we are to act morally, then animals are not at our disposal to use 
as we choose.  Right holders cannot be harmed on the grounds of others’ 
benefits.  Regan argues that this is a prima facie right because the right of the 
innocent may be overridden in two situations covered by “the 
miniride/minimize” and “worse-off” principles that are derivable from the 
respect principle. Regan defends using these two principles to decide whom to 
harm where it is impossible not to harm someone who has moral standing.  
According to the “Miniride” Principle, “Special consideration aside, 
when we must choose between overriding the rights of many who are innocent 
or the rights of the few who are innocent, and when each affected individual 
will be harmed in a prima facie comparable way, then we ought to choose to 
override the rights of the few in preference to overriding the rights of the 
many”.TP33PT Regan admits that, where it applies, this principle yields the same 
conclusions as the principle of utility, but he emphasizes that the reasoning is 
nonutilitarian. The focus, he says, is on individuals rather than the aggregate. 
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To minimize the overriding of individual rights is better than to maximize 
aggregate happiness.  
According to the “Worse-off” Principle, “Special consideration aside, 
when we must decide to override the rights of many or the rights of the few 
who are innocent, and when the harm faced by the few would make them 
worse-off than any of the many would be if the other option were chosen, then 
we ought to override the rights of the many”. TP34PT This principle applies where a 
moral agent must choose between two actions, which one will have greater 
harmful consequence than the other will. The moral agent then has a duty to 
choose the alternative with the lesser harmful consequence, even if it affects a 
greater number of subjects-of-a-life. 
   According to Regan, the “special considerations” of ‘miniride’ 
and ‘worse-off’ principles include the presence of acquired duties or rights, 
certain voluntary acts, including risky activity, and the past perpetration of 
injustice on moral agents or patients. However, the “special considerations” 
simply serve to clarify Regan’s notions of what sorts of harm matter for his 
theory.  
For example, in order to illustrate the notion of what sort of harm is 
permitted in the rights view, let us briefly look at Regan’s lifeboat scenario. 
“There are five survivors, four normal adult human beings and a dog, who are 
candidates for occupancy in a lifeboat; there is room enough only for four; 
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someone must go or else all will perish”.TP35PT According to the rights view, the 
humans and the dog are equally morally significant, in that all possess 
sufficient attributes to qualify as a “subject-of-a-life,” a moral standing 
intended to grant equal rights to those who qualify. Hence, who should be left 
to perish? Regan finds it morally appropriate to let the dog leave the lifeboat 
due to the worse-off principle: when rights must be overridden due to conflict, 
those who would be worse-off by violation of their rights have the conflict 
resolved in their favor. 
 Regan maintains that “The harm that death is, is a function of the 
opportunities for satisfaction it forecloses, and no reasonable person would 
deny that the death of any of the four humans would be a greater prima facie 
loss, and thus a greater prima facie harm, than would be true in the case of the 
dog”.TP36PT The rights view prohibits the harmful use of animals as a means to the 
good of humans. The dog has equal inherent value, and should be treated 
equally with humans. But in preferring the lives of humans to that of the dog in 
the lifeboat example, is Regan falling back on utilitarianism?  
Regan replies that the rights view does not make any appeal to 
consequences. The dog’s risk of dying is assumed to be the same as that run by 
each of the human survivors. Moreover, it is further assumed that no one runs 
this risk because of past violations of rights; for example, no one has been 
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forced or tricked on board. The survivors are all on the lifeboat because, say, 
the mother ship has sunk or the river has flooded. According to Regan, there is 
no hint of inconsistency in making an appeal for the rare case of lifeboat.  
It is wrong, categorically wrong, coercively to put an animal at risk of 
harm, when the animal would not otherwise run this risk, so that others might 
benefit; and it is wrong to do this in a scientific or in any other context because 
such treatment violates the animal’s right to be treated with respect by 
reducing the animal to the status of a mere resource, a mere means, a thing.  
It is not wrong, however, to cast the dog on the lifeboat overboard if the 
dog runs the same risk of dying as the other survivors, if no one has violated 
the dog’s right in the course of getting him on board, and if all on board will 
perish if all continue in their present condition. Therefore, the choice 
concerning who should be saved must be decided by the worse-off principle.  
However, no one has a right to have his lesser harm count for more than 
the greater harm of another. Thus, if death would be a lesser harm for the dog 
than it would be for any of the human survivors, then the dog’s right not to be 
harmed would not be violated if he were cast overboard. In these 
circumstances, the dog’s individual right not to be harmed must be weighed 
equitably against the same right of each of the individual human survivors. To 
weigh these rights in this fashion is not to violate anyone’s right to be treated 
with respect; just the opposite is true, which is why numbers make no 
difference in such a case. 
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 According to Regan, what we must do is to weigh the harm faced by 
one individual against the harm faced by another individual. The harm that is 
caused on an individual should not take into account the harm that across on a 
group or collective basis. It makes no difference of how many individuals 
suffer a lesser or a greater harm.  
The rights view still implies that a million dogs should be thrown 
overboard to save the four human survivors. None should attempt to reach a 
contrary judgement that inevitably involves in aggregative considerations 
because the sum of the losses of the million dogs over and against the losses for 
one of the humans is an approach that cannot be sanctioned by those who 
accept the respect principle. Again, it would not be wrong to cast a million 
humans overboard to save a canine survivor, if the harm brought by death for 
the humans was, in each case, less than the harm of death would be for the dog. 
According to Regan, to decide matters against the one or the million dogs does 
not base on species membership but “it is based on assessing the losses each 
individual faces and assessing these losses equitably”.TP37PT  The rights view 
acknowledges and respects the equality of the individuals involved, both their 
equal inherent value (no one individual’s losses are to be outweighed by 
summing the losses of any group of individuals) and their equal prima facie 
right not to be harmed (no one individual’s lesser harm can count for more 
than another’s greater harm).  
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 Insofar as we are at liberty to exercise the right not to be harmed, it is 
therefore morally permissible for us to do so. He argues that “If we refrain 
from exercising this right, it would be acting in a self-sacrificial manner”.TP PTTP38PT 
That is to say, we could never have a duty to abandon this right since one 
would be worse-off, relative to the others involved.  Since we are not mere 
receptacles, to deny one the freedom to pursue their own welfare is to not treat 
one with respect. Considering other results of actions, like the effect on the 
collective, is to violate individual inherent value. 
 Farmers and meat eaters might claim that they are allowed to go on 
farming and eating. Regan denies this by saying that “Raising animals to eat 
and eating them satisfies all the requirements of the liberty principle”, TP39PT but 
putative harms that may occur to humans from not maintaining things such as 
taste preference, habit, and nutrition, and to the farm industry in particular, 
such as the economic interest, are considered not to fare well in justifying harm 
to others.  
Regan provides three reasons why we are not justified in harming farm 
animals for the sake of taste and culinary challenge. 
 (1) We have no right to eat something just because it tastes good or to 
cook it just because we enjoy preparing it. To say our rights are violated when 
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we are stopped from doing so is to beg the question of whether we have rights 
in the first place. 
 (2) There are other tasty dishes to benefit from, and so a meat dish is 
unnecessary. If we are not deprived by not eating meat, which it does not seem 
like we are, then we are not justified in the harm we cause by eating meat. 
 (3) Even if we were harmed, the harm to animals is far worse and the 
liberty principle would not allow our harming them. 
According to Regan, the claim that meat is the only way to get essential amino 
acids for good health is false. Alternative sources for these nutrients exist, and 
since we can be healthy without meat, meat is not essential for the above 
reason. Our habits, or the conveniences of the group, tell us more about how 
people are, not whether certain acts are moral or just.  
 Regan argues, “The farmer, it might be claimed, will be made worse-off, 
relative to the animals he raises, if we, the consumers, became vegetarians and 
thereby failed to support him”. TP40PT However, the farmer might still be operating 
within his rights, as he would be worse-off by not farming. Still, the farmer 
violates the respect proviso of the principle. The respect principle is further 
violated when beings with inherent value are treated as “renewable resources”, 
as they are treated as a means to some end, i.e., are valued only insofar as they 
serve the interests of others. 
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 According to Regan, the individual’s “value is not reducible to their 
utility relative to the interests of other, and they are always to be treated in 
ways that show respect for their independent value”.  TP41PT Any institution that 
permits or requires treating individuals, as if they were renewable resources, 
violates individuals’ rights. Since industries always treat animals according to 
their utility, the treatment the practice sanctions, and the practice itself, are 
unjust.  
The fundamental injustice endemic to the practice remains if this was 
the only way to achieve the “best aggregate consequences for all those affected 
by the outcome”. He summarizes this section by saying that to treat such 
individuals as mere receptacles is wrong because unjust, and it is unjust 
because it fails to treat them with the respect that is due to them. Thus, Regan 
ends his non-consequentialist account of the animals issue by saying that even 
though needless cruelty to animals may not be construed as violating the rights 
of animals, we must stop assuming that only by violating a right can we be 
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2.2 Differences between Utilitarianism and Rights-based 
perspectives on animal welfares 
In utilitarianism, Singer maintains that the interests of animals may 
sometimes be sacrificed for the greater interests of humans, but in rights-based 
perspectives, Regan adopts a direct duty to a right holder, whether the right 
holder is human or animal, and no one has the right to override another’s 
independent right.  In this regard, we shall focus on the following issues. 
1. Equal Consideration vs. Equal Rights 
 According to Singer, humans as well as animals are equally morally 
considerable beings.  We must take into account the interests not only of 
human beings but also of animals.  If the case for animal equality is sound, 
what follows from it? It does not follow, of course, that animals ought to have 
all of the rights that we think humans ought to have - including, for instance, 
the right to vote. It is equality of consideration of interests, not equality of 
rights, which the case for animal equality seeks to establish. If we fail to 
consider animal interests, or if we give human beings special consideration, we 
are guilty of speciesism. Singer claims that speciesism is no more morally 
defensible than racism, sexism or other forms of discrimination that arbitrarily 
exclude humans from the scope of moral concern.  
Regan criticizes Singer’s view by saying that a utilitarian accepts two 
moral principles. The first is a principle of equality: everyone’s interest counts 
and similar interests must be counted as having similar weight or importance. 
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White or black, male or female, American or Iranian, human or animal: 
everyone’s pain or frustration matters and matters equally with the like pain or 
frustration of anyone else. The second principle a utilitarian accepts is the 
principle of utility: we are to perform the act that will bring about the best 
balance of satisfaction over frustration for everyone affected by the outcome. 
The great appeal of utilitarianism rests with its uncompromising 
egalitarianism: everyone’s interests count and count equally with the like 
interests of everyone else.  
According to Regan, Singer is wrong in treating an individual with 
inherent moral worth as a means to some other ends. Moreover, an individual 
with inherent worth has value in itself, cannot be used merely for the benefit of 
others. Regan provides an alternative to utilitarianism, and argues that a being 
with inherent worth has value-in-itself since the being has preferences, beliefs, 
feelings, recollections, and expectations; and therefore cannot be used as a 
means to some other ends.  
2. Singer vs. Regan on the abolition of using nonhumans 
 After Singer establishes equal consideration of equal interests regardless 
of the species, he attacks two widespread practices: animal experimentation 
and factory farming. As he argues, “Pain and suffering are bad and should be 
prevented or minimized, irrespective of the race, sex, or species of the being 
that suffers ... pains of the same intensity and duration are equally bad, 
 46
whether felt by humans or animals”.TP42PT As a result, there can be no reason to 
excuse a painful experiment on an animal while not allowing it to be carried 
out on a human, which would suffer the same amount. If both feel equal 
amounts of pain, there is no moral difference between testing on a human and 
testing on an animal. If the experiment is picked to be done on an animal over a 
human just because of the fact it is a different species, Singer says this is wrong. 
An experiment on an animal cannot be justifiable unless the experiment is so 
important that the use of a retarded human being would also be justifiable.  
Singer shows the many different sufferings, which take place in modern 
“factory farming”, where animals are currently raised for their flesh. According 
to him, the farmers themselves practice many cruelties in their farms. Singer 
states that “until we boycott meat, we are, each one of us, contributing to the 
continued existence, prosperity, and growth of factory farming and all the cruel 
practices used in rearing animals for food”. TP43PT He maintains that by refraining 
from eating animals, each individual benefits the number of animals that are 
raised for food and forced to lead miserable lives. Although we cannot identify 
any individual animals that we have benefited by becoming vegetarian, we can 
assume that our diet has some impact on the number of animals raised in 
factory farms and slaughtered for food. Speciesism is wrong, and that means 
that, if we take morality seriously, we must try to eliminate speciesist practices 
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from our own life, otherwise no basis remains from which we can avoid animal 
pain.  
As opposed to utilitarianism, Regan takes “an uncompromising position 
against the use of animals from the total abolition of the use of animals in 
science, the total dissolution of commercial animal agriculture, and the total 
elimination of commercial and sport hunting and trapping”. TP44PT For Regan’s 
abolitionist position, we have no right to exploit and harm innocent individuals 
because their equal inherent value has to be respected. He advocates complete 
replacement. The best we can do when it comes to using animals in science is—
not to use them. Neither can we do so even in the case of so lowly a creature as 
a laboratory rat. We have no right to exploit and harm the innocent rat because  
its equal inherent value has to be respected. Thus, it is clear that Regan’s goals 
are more radical than Singer’s. Regan is absolutist in his belief regarding the 
rights of nonhuman animals, while Singer allows the use of animals for our 
benefit if this is in accordance with the utilitarian principle. 
  Regan explores the differences between the rights view and 
utilitarianism on the question ‘why be vegetarian?’ For a utilitarian, in factory 
farming, “if the aggregated consequences turn out to be optimal, then the harm 
is justified”.TP45PT According to Regan, the utilitarian’s case against the harm done 
to farm animals cannot be any stronger than the facts are against allowing it. To 
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meet this challenge, Regan suggests that a utilitarian must have the relevant 
facts that will tell us (1) what the consequences are, all considered, for all those 
affected by the outcome of the harm done to farm animals, as well as what the 
balance of preference satisfactions over preference frustrations are; (2) what the 
consequences are if we were all to become vegetarians, either all at once or 
gradually; (3)  whether if everything is taken into account, these latter 
consequences would be better than the former. Regan’s view, however, does 
not depend on how many others act similarly to yield our duty to be 
vegetation. It is simply that “since this factory-farming routinely violates the 
rights of these animals, for the reasons given, it is wrong to purchase its 
products”. TP46PT Finally, Regan argues that it is not enough to refuse to be 
fulfilling our duty to not eat meat. To recognize the rights of animals is to 
recognize the related duty to defend them against those who violate their 
rights.  Regan suggests that we need help to “educate…to forge the 
opinion…and to work to bring the force of law…. to effect the necessary 
changes”.TP47PT  
3. Both Singer’s and Regan’s views are similar on environmental issues 
    According to Singer, without the capacity to suffer or experience 
pleasure, without sentience, a being has no interests. Singer argues, “Only 
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sentient creatures have wants and desires”TP PTTP48PT or are capable of having future 
desires and therefore they have a good of their own. The fundamental position 
of Singer’s environmental ethics is that nature in the non-sentient world is 
merely of instrumental value. In other words, because nature exists as a 
prerequisite for the existence of sentient beings, a new system of ethics is 
required to protect the environment. The new system is that non-sentient 
objects in the environment such as plant species, rivers, mountains, and 
landscapes, all of which are the objects of moral concern for environmentalists, 
are of no intrinsic but at most instrumental value for the satisfaction of sentient 
beings. 
 Like Singer, Regan also does not believe that plants, species, and 
ecosystems or the so called ‘the environment’ has inherent value. According to 
his rights view, individual beings that have feelings, beliefs, desires for the 
future, psychological identity over time etc are experiencing subjects of a life. 
On the other hand, plants, rivers, species and ecosystem do not have conscious 
feelings or desires for future. Hence, the difference is that subjects-of-a-life are 
‘somebodies’, beings with a biography, not merely biology.  In order to ‘take 
rights seriously’, Regan intends to adopt animal rights seriously, but he does 
not confer similar rights on the collection of nonconscious entities. However, he 
‘leaves open’ the question for others who wish to attribute rights beyond 
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subjects-of-a-life to offer a non-arbitrary and non-prejudicial rational defense of 
doing so.  Individual inanimate natural objects that are not subjects-of-a-life 
might nonetheless have inherent value that is not the same as that of the 
subject-of-a-life.  
For both Singer and Regan, some lower animals e.g. fish, oyster, insects, 
ants etc, and plants, species and ecosystem may not be sentient or a subject-of-
a-life, and therefore the collection of nonsentient entities are left completely out 
of their account of moral standing. However, instrumentally the environment 

















                                                                        THE LAND ETHIC 
 
3.1 The holistic view of the land ethic 
Most formulations of environmental ethic can be drawn from Aldo 
Leopold’s brief essay, “The Land Ethic”, aiming to provide a spectrum of 
environmental ethic, which extend moral standing beyond the animal kingdom 
to plants, land, rivers and ecosystems. As opposed to individualistic 
approaches of ethics, J.Baird Callicott takes the ultimate value of Leopold’s 
land ethic, as the triangular affair, which is adequate to reflect a collective 
good, and is a way of extending moral standing to the environment as a whole. 
Callicott argues that Leopold defines ethics as dual notions of ecology and 
philosophy: “An ethic, ‘ecologically’, is a limitation on freedom of action in the 
struggle for existence, and ‘philosophically’, is a differentiation of social from 
anti-social conduct”.TP PTTP49PT Aiming to connect with these pairing conceptual ideas, 
he says that an ethic is actually a process of ecological evolution based on the 
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1. The concept of the land ethic 
Both Leopold and Callicott believe that there is as yet no ethic dealing 
with man’s relation to land and to the animals and plants, which grow upon it 
According to Callicott, the land ethic unmistakably alludes to Charles Darwin’s 
account of the origin and evolution of ethics in “The Descent of Man”. 
Darwin’s explanation of how we came to have “moral sentiments” is 
particularly ingenious. The very existence of ethics poses an evolutionary 
mystery, which begins with “parental and filial affections, common, perhaps, 
to all mammals”. TP50PT This affection and sympathy between parents and 
offspring permits the formation of small, closely kin social groups, family 
members to less closely related individuals and finally an enlargement of the 
family group.  
According to Callicott, following Darwin’s account of social sentiments, 
our ancestors would survive to pass those behavioral tendencies on to us.  
Moreover, our ancestors could survive and flourish only in a social setting 
because without ethics, society is impossible. Therefore, assuming limitations 
on freedom of action in the struggle for existence, we must become ethical 
before we become rational.  
As Darwin put it, “As man advances in civilization, and small tribes are 
united into larger communities, the simplest reason would tell each individual 
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that he ought to extend his social instincts and sympathies to all the members 
of the same nation, though personally unknown to him.”TP51PT Indeed, if a tribe 
disintegrated, the survival and reproductive success of its former members 
would be doomed. Therefore Darwin thought that actions are regarded by 
savages and were probably so regarded by primeval man, as good or bad, 
solely as they obviously affect the welfare of the tribe—not that of the species, 
nor that of an individual member of the tribe. Darwin, in turn, borrowed 
heavily from David Hume’s ethical philosophy in which there also runs a 
strong strain of holism. For example, Hume insists, “we must renounce the 
theory which accounts for every moral sentiment by the principle of self-
love”.TP52PT We must adopt a more public affection, and allow that the interests of 
society are not, even on their own account, entirely indifferent to us.  However, 
by invoking Darwin’s and Hume’s arguments, Callicott emphasizes a ‘familiar 
sentiment’ which is directed at the well-being of the community or whole, not 
individuals only.  
2. The land community 
 Man’s relation with the land is the basis of the land ethic. Callicott 
thinks that Leopold is retelling Darwin’s story of the evolution of ethics for a 
new ecological community. “The individual is a member of a community of 
interdependent parts. . . . T he land  simply enlarges the boundaries of the 
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community to include soils, waters, plants, wetlands, air etc or collectively: the 
land . . . a land ethic changes the role of Homo sapiens, asT a moral species, 
capable of ethical deliberation and conscientious choice, from conqueror T of the 
land- community to plain member and citizen of it. It implies respect for his 
fellow members and also respect for the community as such”.T TP53PT THere, 
according to Callicott, there are mainly three concepts of the land community. 
 (1) “Land” is a system of interdependent parts, which is regarded as a 
“community”; especially the word “community” may be understood as eco-
wholes e.g. ecosystems and biotic communities.  “The Whole” informs the part, 
which indicates Homo sapiens’ place in the land community by first 
understanding the place of all parts that compose the land as a whole.  
(2) Homo sapiens is a member, not the master, of the land community. 
Humans have to respect his fellow members as well as to understand the land 
community’s interest. 
 (3) The land personally cannot preserve its resources but Homo sapiens, 
(as historically observed) as the conqueror of other members of the biotic 
community, can play a role to preserve all other members of the community.   
Members of the biotic community, whether they are identified as he, 
she, it or they, all possess the same degree of moral consideration.  If human 
beings are, with other animals, plants, soils, and waters, equally members of 
                                                 
TP
53
PT . Aldo Leopold, “The Land Ethic”, p.148 
 55
the biotic community, and if community membership is the criterion of equal 
moral consideration, then not only do animals, plants, soils, and waters have 
equal rights, but human beings are equally subject to the same subordination of 
individual welfare, and rights in respect to the good of the community as a 
whole.   
3. The Land Pyramid 
  The “Land Pyramid” is made of many layers, each layer of which 
is a part.   This image illustrates that plants and animals alike, are considered as 
parts of a food chain, which is the line of dependency for foods and other 
services, and this includes humans as well. The pyramid is a tangle of chains so 
complex as to seem disorderly, yet the stability of the system proves it a highly 
organized structure. Leopold recognizes that eating and being eaten, living and 
dying, are what have allowed the biotic community to function and flourish for 
thousands of millions of years.  A right to life is not consistent with the 
structure of the biotic community.  The ecological relationships determine the 
nature of organisms, rather than the other way around.  
 According to Leopold, man is one of thousands of accretions to the 
height and complexity of the pyramid, and more specifically, “man shares an 
intermediate layer with the bears, the raccoons, and squirrels which eat both 
meat and vegetables”.TP54PT We humans are among the members of this biotic 
pyramid, not outside and above it, but a plain member and citizen of it. Our 
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layer has been made by evolutionary link after link as an elaboration and 
diversity of the biota.  
According to him, we should see the Land as a pyramidal system with 
interconnected chains – a fountain of energy flowing through a circuit of soil, 
plants, and animals. The ecological point of view recognizes that all species are 
ecologically valuable, and that we are likely to never fully understand the 
relations between things that enable ecological systems to be sustained. This 
interdependence between the complex structure of the land and its smooth 
functioning parts is one element of its basic attribution as the land pyramid. We 
humans are to be assumed as members of the pyramid, but historically, we are 
morally the top being, and therefore we ought to consider the impact on nature 
of all of our actions.   
As Leopold observes, “Man’s invention of tools has enabled him to 
make changes of unprecedented violence, rapidity, and scope”.TP55PT  For Leopold, 
violence is harmful to the well being of the land pyramid since for human’s 
violence, thousands of species are vanishing and the land is losing its natural 
state. According to him, we have effectively destroyed the pyramid, and 
therefore this allows us to prevent ourselves from being eaten by our natural 
predators. For instance, these changes have already caused an unacceptable 
amount of disruption e.g., the extinction of floras and faunas.   Another change 
touches the flow of energy through plants and animals and its return to soil. 
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Thus, to explain such changes that have been caused by humans, Leopold 
wants to say that humans have changed the ecosystem dramatically through 
using technology on a world-wide scale. In this way, if man-made changes go 
ahead continuously, we will still have more comprehensive effects that were 
absent before. Hence, if we wish to continue our existence with nature, we need 
to go beyond our self-interest.   
The land ethic is thus holistic. It is summed up by a moral maxim, “A 
thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the 
biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.” TP56PT According to the 
moral maxim of the land ethic, what is especially note-worthy, and that to 
which attention should be directed, is the idea that the good of the biotic 
community is the ultimate measure of the moral value, the rightness or 
wrongness of actions. Each member of the biotic community has its own 
function to preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of the system.  Animals 
of those species, like the honeybee, which promote the integrity of the 
community would have greater claim of moral standing than others who do 
not do so. Moreover, certain plants or grass, similarly, may be overwhelmingly 
important to the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community, while 
overpopulated deer or domestic sheep could be a pestilential threat to the 
natural floral community. The land ethic, thus, permits animals to be killed, 
trees to be felled and so on.  
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The focus of our moral concern shifts gradually away from plants, 
animals, soils, and waters severally to the biotic community collectively. Moral 
considerability is conferred on the biotic community per se, and individual 
members of the community are to be subordinated in order to preserve the 
integrity, stability, and the beauty of the biotic community.  That means 
individuals have become subordinated to the interests of the interconnected 
whole.  Plants, animals, soils and waters are integrated into one super-
organism. The land ethic thus offers the ultimate value to the ecosystem.  
The value of everything is derived from its functioning in the ecosystem, 
and so the well-being of individual organisms should be considered inasmuch 
as they contribute to the ecological whole. Thus, the value of individuals is 
context-dependent, relating to their function and significance in the whole.  
They are vital to the ecosystem only insofar as they tend to preserve the 
keystone, the so-called integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community. 
If they do not play a role in the system, they will not have value.  When forced 
to adjudicate between the competing interests of individuals, the land ethic 
relies on the degree to which each individual promotes the integrity, stability 
and beauty of the biotic community. To maintain the land’s continued 
existence, we have to conserve the natural ecosystem. 
4. The land conservation 
 While we regard nonhumans as ethical beings, they are not able to 
conserve nature, as we are, to form the concept of universal biotic community.   
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In accordance with nature, since we are the morally top being, we are able to 
choose to conserve nature, not treat it simply as resources to be taken 
advantage of. Rather, our selfless obligation should go beyond our self-interest 
or economic comforts in order to develop an ecological conscience. As Leopold 
states it well, “Obligations have no meaning without conscience, and the 
problem we face is the extension of the social conscience from people to 
land.”TP57PT It follows that the continuance of the integrity, stability and beauty of 
the land may be stopped if we lack conscience, or if we seek to maximize our 
own self-interests at the expense of the natural surroundings. Thus, Leopold 
concludes his essay saying, “It is inconceivable to me that an ethical relation to 
land can exist without love, respect, and admiration for the land, and a high 
regard for its value. By value, I of course mean something far broader than 
mere economic value; I mean value in the philosophical sense”.TP58PT 
  By the dictum “value in the philosophical sense”, Callicott means 
“intrinsic value” or “inherent value”. “Something with intrinsic value or 
inherent worth is valuable in and of itself”,TP59PT not because of what it can do for 
us. A land ethic, then, reflects the existence of an ecological conscience, and this 
in turn reflects the acceptance of individual responsibility for the health of the 
land.  In human history, we play the conqueror role. Without the healthy 
resources, our survival may be uneconomic.  An ethical relation to the Land 
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requires love, respect, and admiration for the Land, and a high regard for its 
value (moral value, not economic value). But the likelihood of many people 
coming to have this view seems not great. We are separated off from nature -- 
both physically or geographically, and conceptually -- and so do not have the 
required connection to the Land. Also, there still remains the rather strong 
view that the Land must be conquered and put to use, if it not to be wasted. 
The development of the Land Ethic is an intellectual as well as an emotional 












3.2 Limitation of the Land ethic 
Leopold and Callicott are correct to suppose that the land ethic offers a genuine 
alternative to moral theories of anthropocentrism and animal welfarism. In 
addition, Callicott and Leopold can claim that the attribution of inherent value 
to individuals may be in direct conflict with environmental goals, in the case of 
preservation of plants, species and ecosystems. From individualistic 
perspectives, as Tom Regan states, “animal welfarism and environmentalism 
are like oil and water: they do not mix”.  TP60PT It may present some difficult real-
world dilemmas.  Therefore, in spite of the usefulness of the land ethic, in 
helping us to rethink our relationship with our environment, it is not free of 
some serious objections. 
1. The Land Ethic is Guilty of Environmental Fascism 
 Tom Regan explains that sacrificing the individual for the greater biotic 
good might be guilty of “environmental fascism”. TP61PT  Using Regan’s example,   
if a human being is “only a member of the biotic team”, with the same moral 
standing as other members of the team, and there was a situation which pitted 
the life of a rare wildflower against a human life, would it not contribute more 
to the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community to kill the human 
and save the wildflower?  From a rights perspective, this conclusion could 
never be reached because a rights perspective denies the propriety of deciding 
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what should be done to individuals who have rights by appeal to aggregate 
considerations, including decisions that would benefit the integrity, stability, 
and beauty of the biotic community. Regan states, “Individual rights are not to 
be outweighed by such consideration (which is not to say that they are never to 
be outweighed)”.61TP62PT  Regan’s view does not deny the possibility that 
collections of ecosystems might have inherent value. But we are not justified in 
maintaining the natural ecosystem at the expense of the rights of humans and 
animals.  
2. The Land Ethic is accused of Hunting as a practice 
 According to Regan, the rights view does not recognize the moral rights 
of species to anything, including survival.  It recognizes, “The prima facie right 
of individuals not to be harmed, and thus the prima facie right not to be 
killed”. TP63PT On the other hand, Callicott recognizes that “the land ethic is 
logically coherent in demanding at once that moral consideration be given to 
plants as well as to animals, and yet in permitting animals to be killed, trees 
felled, and so on”,TP64PT Regan’s view does not adopt the feature of the land ethic.  
For Callicott, when a large number of deers fails to maintain the ecological 
beauty and stability of grass species by eating them, then it is permissible to kill 
or hunt a large number of deer. That is to say, killing or hunting is not 
incompatible with the land ethic, even when these actions involve suffering or 
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harming. Hence, it can be argued that Callicott accepts killing a number of deer 
if they destroy the beauty of grass species.  
Obviously, Singer’s sentientism or Regan’s subject-of-a-life theory does 
not support hunting or trapping.  Regan rejects the view that “hunting animals 
is humane since it is a means of population control, and prevents starvation 
and thus suffering”.TP PTTP65PT He gives the following reasons:  (a). Death from being 
hunted is not always more humane than suffering from starvation.  (b) Not all 
trappers and hunters are so expert in hunting or trapping. Hence, it is not 
conceivable that death by being hunted or trapped would be more humane 
than the death by starvation. Moreover, death of animals by a poor shot or a 
poorly tended trap causes a slow, agonizing death than those who die from 
starvation.  (c) The establishment of hunting ensures that an increasing number 
of animals are killed for sport annually, not a decrease in the total population. 
Thus, according to Regan, one’s appeal to “humane concern” TP66PT is odd with 
hunting and trapping practices. Moreover, Callicott ought not to disregard the 
inherent value of deer regardless of their population size, for what counts 
morally is not the size of the population in which the individual animal 
belongs. It is the fact that individual members are equal in value, have inherent 
worth, and therefore have the right to be treated with respect.  
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3. Promoting the best integrity of the land community bears the best inherent 
value 
“Rationality, self-consciousness or subject-of-a-life, and sentience or 
consciousness has been the typical criteria for moral standing” suggested by 
Kant, Regan, Singer et.al, whereas the Land Ethic, as defended by Callicott, has 
taken the summum bonum to be “the integrity, stability, and beauty of the 
biotic community.” The value of an individual is determined by its role in 
promoting the integrity, stability, and beauty of the ecosystem.  
 While honeybees work more to promote the integrity, stability and 
beauty of the economy of the ecosystem than the deer, does the land ethic 
entail that honeybees have greater value than the deer, and consequently, 
humans? If Callicott replies that the individual who promotes the integrity or 
stability of the ecosystem may be regarded as the fittest individual of the 
community, then arguably, honeybees work more than humans, and hence 
they have greater value than us. Who has the capacity to promote the integrity 
of the biotic community? Is he a human or an animal or bees via pollination?  
Callicott can claim that humans are historically the most adapted species 
of all, and therefore humans should have obligations to promote the integrity 
of the biotic community. While the land ethic regards humans as “plain 
members and citizens”, and our well-being is made subordinate to the overall 
well being of the biotic community, do we humans act upon it regardless of 
what our socialization tells us?  Moreover, while any other citizen of the biotic 
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community, e.g. a deer or the honey bee, does not try to promote the integrity 
of an endangered species e.g. grass, or does not care for other sentient animals’ 
pain or suffering, one can claim that humans are able to manipulate and alter 
their environment to a much larger degree than non-rational, non-intelligent 
beings can. Thus, being rational, it only follows that we will do so, given the 
ability to synthesize, use, change, etc, and given the rationality to see that it 
benefits us to do so. 
4. There is a conflict between animal welfarism and the land ethic 
 There is an important difference between the land ethic and theories 
about nonhuman animal moral standing. As stated earlier, on the one hand, 
both Singer’s and Regan’s views are atomistic in the sense that it is individuals 
that are assigned moral standing. Both Singer and Regan defend individual 
human and animal moral rights, and their respectful treatment, e.g. we ought 
not to harm them. Moreover, they argue for vegetarianism so that we do not 
kill or hunt nonhuman animals in order to be satisfy our diet. Since animals are 
conscious beings, have interests, we ought not to violate their interests. The 
environment is valuable to us since we, both humans and animals, benefit from 
it.   
On the other hand, the land ethic is holistic in the sense that it is the 
community comprised of humans, animals, plants, land, rivers and ecosystems 
that have moral standing—and not individuals on their own. However, if a 
member of the biotic team promotes the integrity, stability and beauty of the 
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biotic community, he/she/it can have a higher inherent value than another 
individual who does not make such a contribution.  
The land ethic implies that an individual has rights in proportion to its 
contribution towards keeping the biotic community healthy; it devalues the 
individual who does not make a contribution towards the integrity of the 
community. One more problem may arise. Suppose, we are now with the 
human race in excess of 6 billion, does the land ethic allow the killing of a 
significant percentage of humans in order to prevent the disintegrating effects 
of human population exploitation?  
According to Callicott, humans, as moral beings, should have an 
obligation to preserve the land in a parental and filial relation for their own 
sake.  The problem, for animal welfarists, is that while Callicott supports the 
land ethic, he does not prohibit the killing or hunting of animals in order to 
keep the land healthy. Moreover, Callicott argues, domestic animals are 
unnatural, tame, and humans’ artificial creation. We need not liberate them in 
the wilds.   There is nothing wrong with slaughtering “meat animals” for food 
so long as this is not in violation of a kind of evolved and unspoken social 
contract between man and beast. However, Callicott agrees with Singer and 
Regan in attacking factory farming, since factory-farmed industry produces 
more pain than the practice of vegetarianism.  
Perhaps, these implications have suggested to both Singer and Regan 
that the holism of the land ethic is conceptually flawed, and thus is an 
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Environmental Fascism. Both Singer and Regan object to the failure of a 
Leopoldian land ethic to take seriously the sentience, moral rights, or moral 
considerability of individual animals. In this way, if animal welfarism will have 
continued the conflicts with environmentalism, there will be no hope for the 
resolution of the conflicts between the two. It might be objected that I have not 
yet taken into account of the possibility of resolving the conflict between holists 
and individualists. In order to resolve the conflict between them, some 
philosophers try to combine the two views.  
For example, some of the themes of Callicott’s “Triangular affair” were 
echoed by Mark Sagoff, who asks, “If the suffering of animals creates human 
obligation to mitigate it, is there not as much an obligation to prevent a cat 
from killing a mouse as to prevent a hunter from killing a deer?”.TP67PT  Similarly, 
if nonhuman animals are said to have certain rights, such as a right to life, then 
we have a corresponding obligation to protect those rights. For example, we 
should provide them necessary habitats for their flourishing. According to 
Sagoff, a philosophically interesting claim is that although animal liberationists 
insist on the stronger thesis that there is an obligation to serve the interests or 
to protect the lives, of all animals who suffer or are killed, whether on the farm 
or in the wild, do they feel an obligation to preserve the environment? On the 
other hand, Sagoff claims that for Callicott, the obligation to preserve the 
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integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community, “whatever those words 
mean, implies no duties whatever to individual animals in the community, 
except in the rare instance in which an individual is important to functioning of 
that community”. TP68PT Sagoff believes that while it might be appropriate to 
endeavor to protect domestic animals’ rights to life, it would be absurd, not to 
mention ecologically disastrous, to endeavor to protect wild animals’ right to 
life. Thus, he concludes that a humanitarian ethic--an appreciation not of 
nature, but of the welfare of animals--will not help us to understand or to 
justify an environmental ethic.   
 Like Sagoff, Marry Anne Warren, in her article, The Rights of Nonhuman 
World, echoes some of the themes of Callicott, and criticizes some of the themes 
of animal welfarists. She argues, “Neither philosopher (Singer or Regan) is 
committed to the claim that the moral status of animals is completely identical 
to that of humans”.TP69PT According to her claim, on the one hand, Singer’s basic 
principle of equal consideration does not imply identical treatments; on the 
other hand, Regan holds that animals have the same moral standing as do 
human beings, not that all of their rights (habitats, food etc) are necessarily the 
same.  
She argues that all rational human beings are equally part of the moral 
community since we can reason with each other about our behavior, whereas 
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we cannot reason with an animal.  Both humans and animals have rights but 
animal rights are not equal to humans’.  Animals do not enjoy the same rights 
as humans. For example, a man who shoots squirrels for sport may or may not 
be acting reprehensibly; but it is difficult to believe that his actions should be 
placed in exactly the same moral category as those of a man who shoots 
women, or black children, for sport. Therefore, she is in “doubt” that human 
and animal rights are alike.  
According to Warren, “Subject hood’ comes in degrees”.TP70PT She 
recommends that human beings have strong rights because of our autonomy; 
animals have weaker rights because of their sentience; some creatures have 
only a little self-awareness, and only a little capacity to anticipate the future, 
while some have a little more, and some a good deal more. The environment 
has a right because of its wholeness and unity. Something might have inherent 
value yet have no moral standing. Forests, streams, marshes etc are essential 
for the flourishing of animals. Nonsentient natural entities may have intrinsic 
value or not, but they ought to be protected, even at some cost to certain 
human interests. 
However, she claims that both animal welfarism and environmentalism 
are “complementary; each helps to remedy some of the apparent defects of the 
other”.TP71PT But the problem, on the one hand, is that animal welfare theory does 
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not in itself explain why we ought to protect only individual animals, 
threatened species of animals and plants; the land ethic, on the other hand, fails 
to explain why it is wrong to inflict suffering or death even upon domestic 
animals, which may play a little role for the maintenance of natural ecosystem. 
However, Warren tries to combine the two rival approaches to ethics, but she 
maintains some hierarchies in her ethics. For instance, (1) she rejects the view 
that the moral status of all living beings must be (egalitarian) equal; Instead she 
ascribes equal moral standing to the class of moral agents or persons, and 
moral status of the rest of all living beings should be gradual.  (2) Sentience is 
sufficient but not necessary for attributing moral rights because anti-cruelty 
principles are not sufficient to provide adequate protection and do not 
recognize the wrong of harming and killing (painlessly) animals. In addition, 
the rights of most non-human animals may be overridden in circumstances 
which would not justify overriding  the rights of humans.(3) Respecting the 
interests of creatures who, like ourselves, are subject to pleasure and pain is in 
no way inconsistent with valuing and protecting the richness and diversity of 
the natural ecosystems.   
Like Warren, Louis Lombardi in his article “Inherent Worth, Respect 
and Rights”, develops a deontological approach where the value of different 
kinds of living beings is hierarchical. Responding to Regan, Lombardi argues 
that inherent worth is not equal in all and any living things. Every living being 
possess inherent worth, but they do not have it equally. It should be gradual, 
depending on their capacities. And, he argues, it is a worth-giving capacity, 
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and “all and any living beings possess it (inherent worth) in degrees”.TP72PT 
Humans, animals, plants are different types of living beings; these types are 
differentiated by the range of their capacities; the greater the range of an 
entity’s capacities, the higher the degree of its inherent worth. A plant, for 
instance, has vegetative capacities which give it a little “value-added”; 
mammals have vegetative capacities, but are also sentient, the added capacity 
to feel pleasure and pain giving additional value; while human beings, having 
other additional capacities, such as reflectiveness, have even greater value-
added. Thus, Lombardi constructs a hierarchical individualist deontological 
environmental ethic built on difference of capacities between species. The 
baseline capacity, being alive, gives inherent worth; but other added capacities 
give extra worth. 
 There is a good reason for thinking that such reconciliation is possible. 
Holmes Rolston has attempted “to solve the conflict” by taking a different 
synthesis of individualism and holism. He vigorously attacks Callicott’s 
argument that “nature is of value in itself.” Instead, he claims that “every 
organism has a good-of-its-kind; it defends its own kind as a good kind, and 
thus morally considerable”.TP73PT Rolston argues that we humans, self-conscious 
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rational animals, can realize a greater range of values, but conscience ought not 
to be used to exempt every other form of life from consideration. A species may 
lack moral agency, reflective self-awareness, sentience, or organic 
individuality, but each ongoing species defends a form of life, and these are on 
the whole good things, arising in a process out of which humans have evolved.   
Nevertheless, humans take precedence over all individual animals; and 
sentient animals possess more inherent value than plants and other insentient 
things. Although he introduces the notion of inherent value in order to 
promote all sentient to insentient beings’ good, one can argue that he implicitly 
keeps in mind a certain kind of hierarchy between them. For example, while 
Rolston confers moral standing on all natural entities, on the one hand, he 
attributes higher inherent value to humans than to animals; and on the other 
hand, animals have more inherent value than  plants, species and ecosystem. In 
addition, if we give moral consideration to something, we cannot harm it (this 
argument is true for both Regan and Singer).However, Rolston defends meat 
eating, by saying that “when eating (humans) ought to minimize animal 
suffering”.TP74PT Such a claim is uncontroversial enough that we might not notice 
that he does not say why humans ought to minimize animal suffering. Thus, it 
is hard, for Rolston, to claim that his ethic is either holistic or individualistic.  
Nevertheless, this combination of individualism and holism may leave 
animal liberationists wondering about the further implications of this 
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resolution for the treatment of animals. Obviously, a good deal of work has 
already been done on this topic. Initially, philosophers thought that humanism 
could be extended to include animal liberation and eventually environmental 
concern. Nevertheless, the resulting conflicts are, as Callicott saw, “a triangular 
affair”, Sagoff saw “a bad marriage and a quick divorce”, and Mary Ann 
Warren tends to play down the opposition between animal welfarism and 
environmental concern. I see there is a good reason for thinking that such 
reconciliation is possible. If we adopt the priority of nonhuman animal moral 
standing, we are left to further consideration of all and any individual, who are 
inherently necessary for flourishing the biotic community.  
 
                                                                                  
























                                 CHAPTER 4 
THE MORAL STANDING OF ANIMALS,  
                                            AND OF THE ENVIRONMENT                                          
                                               (A DEFENSE OF TOM REGAN) 
The arguments from chapters 1, 2, & 3 propose that all sentient individual are 
to be ascribed inherent value, irrespective of whether they are humans or 
animals. Peter Singer has attempted to provide a utilitarian defense of the 
moral standing of all sentient beings; Tom Regan has proposed a Kantian 
defense of the moral standing of all experiencing subjects-of-a-life. For Singer 
and Regan, individual humans and animals are valuable in themselves. On the 
other hand, Leopold and Callicott have proposed the moral standing of nature, 
as a whole. Although all of their views seem to be conceptually distinct from 
each other, they have a similarity in the extension of moral standing beyond the 
anthropocentric view that all and only humans deserve moral standing.   
Considered from this aspect, I am going to look at some of the most important 
accounts of environmental issues, which discuss how we should behave 
toward nonhuman animals, and their survival environment. I reject the 
consequentialist viewpoint of ethical theories (whether they are animal 
welfarism or environmental holism) in favor of deontological ethics.  
4.1 The moral standing of animals 
In the context of “biotic rights”, both Leopold and Callicott are 
consistent in their views that the biotic community is of value, UnotU “right to life 
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for individual members”,TP75PT whether humans or animals. For instance, Callicott 
voices a doubt about “animal rights” by distinguishing domestic from wild 
animals. The holism of the land ethic is intended to apply to wild animals 
living and dying in wild biotic communities, and therefore Callicott need not 
think about domestic animals. Because “domestic animals are creations of man; 
their living result is of human genetic engineering and training, and therefore 
they do not have a natural niche in wild biotic communities”. TP76PT It seems that 
the land ethic is concerned with how human beings should relate to the wild 
biotic communities of nature. Hence, the fate of domestic animals rests on a 
different foundation from that of wild animals. However, there is no question 
of “liberating” them and returning them to their “natural” place in the biotic 
community.  
Perhaps Callicott assumes that if we liberate domestic animals to the 
wilds, on the one hand, we will “no longer have meat to eat, TP77PT and on the 
other hand, they will harm the natural environment. If we follow Callicott’s 
view on nonhuman animal moral status, we may choose to continue using 
animals, which human cultures have created, or we may allow these species to 
become extinct.  One question arises. If domestic animals cannot be released 
into the wild in part, can’t the same be said for human beings? Suppose that 
according to Darwinian human evolution, humans are domesticated in an 
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evolutionary process; human beings have lost the particular wild niche, which 
they once had, just as the animals have.  
Unlike Callicott, Peter Singer, the pre-eminent animal welfarist, in the 
beginning of his Animal Liberation, asserts that species membership is not a 
morally relevant reason for treating animals different from humans. To avoid 
speciesism, Singer argues, human beings “must allow all beings which are 
similar in all relevant respects, such as self-awareness, capacity to suffering, to 
have a similar right to life and mere membership in our biological species 
cannot be morally relevant criterion for this right”.TP78PT  It may seem that Singer 
attributes rights to animals, but he does not. Rather, he gives equal moral 
consideration to animals. That is to say, Singer’s view is not necessarily that 
animals have rights, which are to be respected. Instead, his concept of ‘animal 
liberation’ points out that moral consideration given to animals should be of 
equal significance with those shown to humans. However, the interests of 
animals may sometimes be sacrificed for the greater interests of humans.  
Singer’s utilitarianism does not ultimately support as strong a case for animal 
welfare as Regan does.   
Unlike Singer and Callicott, Regan adopts a different approach to 
defending the moral standing of animals.  Regan seeks a solution by attributing 
“rights” to animals in terms of “being subject-of-a-life”. According to him, “The 
rights view is a view about the moral rights of individuals” and not species, 
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one being a member of an endangered “species confers no further right on that 
animal”.TP79PT Since species are not individuals, species are not covered under the 
rights view. Regan claims that an individual animal being among the last 
remaining members of a species confers no further right on that animal.  It 
would seem that we should protect an endangered individual because by not 
doing so, we are violating its rights not to be harmed (e.g., destroying its 
natural habitat for economic profit). We do this not because it is part of an 
endangered species, but because all animals, endangered or not, have these 
rights. On this score, Regan’s justification is much more demanding, since he 
takes the notion of rights more seriously. He spells out in greater detail the 
conditions under which it can be justified or excused to cause harm to a 
subject-of-a-life. Within his deontological framework, it is not an acceptable 
excuse to harm any subject-of-a-life in order to benefit others. 
One difficulty stems from Regan’s view in the conflicts of interests 
between humans and nonhumans. How ought we to adjudicate conflicts of 
interests between humans and nonhumans? As Sagoff argues, if we are to give 
“the rights” the same meaning when applied to both people and animals, “to 
allow animals to be killed for food or to permit them to die of disease or 
starvation when it is within human power to prevent it, does not seem to 
balance fairly the interests of animals with those of human beings”.TP80PT 
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We have an obligation to protect individuals who are self-aware, and 
consciously strive for many things. Since we are moral beings, we can know 
what is good or bad for us. Of course, nonhuman animals do not know what is 
good or bad for them since they lack rationality, capacity to use language or 
moral agency. We are aware of our natural environment more than nonhuman 
animals are. In addition, since we are conscious of how to survive, we can 
boycott meat, and be vegetarian in order to avoid harm to animals, according 
to animal welfarists.  The tiger with equal inherent value has an equal right to 
life like us. Since we have no right to override the tiger’s independent right, we 
cannot hunt or kill the tiger in order to satisfy our own interests. The problem 
is that while the tiger hunts or kills the deer in order to survive, of course, the 
deer being killed for the survival interest of the tiger also causes the same harm 
that would be caused to the deer by the tiger. Obviously, Regan’s view does 
not solve the problem that is caused by one animal harming other. 
Nevertheless, if we try to solve this, again we will have to face the conflict 
between animal welfarism and holism. For a holist, Callicott, “eating and being 
eaten, living and dying are what make the biotic community hum”.TP PTTP81PT While 
the tiger eats the deer, does Regan need to protect the deer from being killed by 
the tiger?  Callicott attacks Regan, and argues that an animal welfarist must 
favor protecting “innocent vegetarian animals from their carnivorous 
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predators”. TP82PT Sagoff also supports this view, and argues, “The animal will be 
eaten; the few will die of old age, and so vegetarianism is a less opportunity to 
mitigate suffering”.TP83PT However, a holist seems to note that we can hardly avoid 
taking life in order to have something to eat.   That means, the reconciliation 
between animal welfarists and environmental ethicists is not possible, and may 
not be united under a common theoretical umbrella; since while animal 
welfarist adopts vegetarianism, the holist does not. 
For animal welfarists, nonconscious entities are neither subject-of-a-life 
nor sentient, but are useful in giving pleasure or preference-satisfactions to 
individuals. In this sense, I believe that if we are to protect the rights of 
animals, including their right to live, then we should add at least one duty 
apart from refraining from harming them, and that duty is to preserve their 
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4.2. Values in, and Duties to, nature  
The interest (related to individual flourishing e.g. survival, health and 
physical activity) that individual humans and animals have in their 
environment is an interest in the preservation of insentient entities e.g. plants, 
species, and ecosystem.   
 What are Singer’s arguments against broadening the class of beings 
with moral standing beyond sentient beings? Singer begins with a definition of 
intrinsic value. According to Singer, “an X is of intrinsic value if it is good or 
desirable in itself; the contrast is with being of instrumental value, where X is 
good as a means”.TP84PT  Non-sentient objects are of no intrinsic value, because 
they are incapable of desiring something consciously.  A critic of Singer says, 
“A tree as Singer explains, may be said to have an “interest” in being watered, 
but all this means is that it needs water to grow properly as an automobile 
needs oil to function properly”.TP85PT  At most, trees are of instrumental value to 
the satisfaction of sentient beings. According to Singer, without sentient 
interests, who would extend the class of those with intrinsic value? There is no 
way of assessing the relative weight to be given to, say, preserving a two 
thousand year old Huon Pine compared to a tussock of grass.   
For Regan, the paradigmatic right-holders are individuals, and therefore 
“If individual trees have inherent value, then their rights cannot be overridden 
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by the collection of insentient entities”.TP86PT He asks how the notion of rights of 
the individual could find a home, within the “the greater biotic good” of 
Leopold.  
According to Regan, there are three problems with assigning rights to 
the collection of plants, species and ecosystem.  (1) The collection of insentient 
entities have one kind of inherent value, which is not the same as that of the 
subject-of-a-life; (2) The inherent value of the subject-of-a-life is not reducible to 
the value of the collection of insentient entities; (3) Insentient entities cannot 
strive for something consciously, and therefore attributing rights to them is a 
very difficult task. Arguing thus Regan claims that individuals, who are 
subjects-of-a-life, are not to be outweighed by the aggregate good of the biotic 
community. Sacrificing the subject-of-a-life for the greater biotic good might be 
guilty of environmental fascism. While a holistic ethicist, Callicott claims that 
the land ethic has “an emphasis on the good of the biotic community, and a de-
emphasis on the welfare of individual members of it”, TP87PT how does he claim 
that some members of certain species are to be  culled for the sake of the 
integrity of the ecosystem? A tension does indeed exist between the rights of 
individual members and the good of the biotic community as a whole.  While 
the integrity of the community is considered above the individual animals, 
Callicott seems to contradict his argument that moral consideration for an 
individual living being is preempted by the concern for the integrity of the 
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biotic system. Therefore, overpopulated deer can be culled to keep the 
ecosystem healthy. Nevertheless, while we are “plain members and citizen” of 
the biotic community, “would massive human diebacks be good” for keeping 
the biotic community healthy?  Of course, the answer, for any reasonable 
person, should be negative. Therefore, Regan’s claim, the land ethic is a clear 
case of “environmental fascism” is obviously true for Callicott. However, 
Callicott needs not to be worried about the holism of the land ethic. There is a 
good reason to agree with Rolston’s statement that “humans count enough to 
have the right to flourish in ecosystems, but not so much that they have the 
right to degrade or shut down ecosystems”.TP88PT  If you agree with this view, of 
course, you have to take humans into account first, next sentient animals and 
finally the rest, e.g. species and ecosystem, as Rolston does. However, Callicott 
agrees with us that “there can be no value apart from an evaluator, that all 
value (the ultimate value of the biotic community) is as it were in the eye of the 
beholder”.TP89PT The value that is attributed to the ecosystem, therefore, is 
dependent on some variety of morally sensitive consciousness. In other words, 
human evaluations should not be excluded from the constitution of the 
inherent value of the environment. If Callicott thinks that an evaluator is 
necessary to evaluate the environment, whether it is valuable in itself or not, 
why do humans not take precedence over insentient entities, whether they are 
individuals or not?  However, Callicott does seem to indicate his belief that the 
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human community has rights that extend beyond the right for basic survival or 
continued existence. Callicott does not intend a kind of environmental fascism. 
Rather he emphasizes that the land ethic does require a dramatic change in 
how we interact, live, and make choices within the biotic community.    
James P. Sterba attacks Callicott: “Assuming that people’s basic needs 
are at stake, how could it be morally objectionable for them to try to meet those 
needs, even if this were to harm other species, whole ecosystems, or even, to 
some degree, the whole biotic community?” TP90PT  If people’s basic needs are at 
stake, it is very unreasonable for them to be sacrificed for the good of the biotic 
community.  When lives or basic needs are at stake, the individualist 
perspective seems generally “incontrovertible”. According to Sterba, it will be 
difficult for holists to object when we are required to intervene in culling elk 
herds in wolf-free ranges or preserving the habitat of endangered species, as 
these are morally permissible. This shows that it is possible to agree with 
individualists when the basic needs of human beings are at stake, and to agree 
with holists when they are not. 
Although Sterba adopts the individual good, he takes the precedence of 
human interests over nonhumans’, as Callicott does. In addition, for him, if 
non-conscious entities have value, they have it in some degrees. Thus, it is hard 
to see the environment is valuable in itself.  Even if the environment does have 
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value “in itself”, we can only understand this value in human and animal 
terms—for we are, after all, only humans and animals.    
However, the environment is not valuable in itself, apart from its 
relationship to both humans and animals. We can extend moral standing to 
animals, to which we have direct duties. Obviously, Regan’s view does not 
include direct duties to the environment that relates to animal flourishing. 
However, an entirely new problem arises: resolving conflicts between 
protecting endangered species, e.g. plants, and protecting the rights of subjects-
of-a-life.  
Like Regan, James Fieser also illustrates this problem in his quotation 
from W.D.Ross. Suppose, “A stranded mountain climber is on the verge of 
starvation, and can only stay alive by eating a plant that is next to him. He then 
sees that this plant is the last surviving member of its species. If he eats the 
plant, he knows he will remain alive long enough to be rescued. If he does not 
eat the plant, then the plant species will survive and flourish with the coming 
growing season”.TP91PT Two duties conflict in this example:  the preservation of the 
                                                 
TP
91
PT . James Fieser, “An Argument against Normative Ecocentrism” in his Metaethics, 
Normative Ethics, and Applied Ethics: Historical and Contemporary Readings, (Belmont, 
Calif.: Wadsworth Thomson Learning 1999) p. 499. According to Fieser, the moral 
dilemma presented here, as well as those which follow, aims at presenting a moral 
human with a forced choice between two mutually exclusive moral duties. The 




subject-of-a-life, a stranded mountain climber, and the biotic duty to preserve 
species diversity, the last survival plant. 
  For any particular duty that emerges, we are under an obligation to 
perform that duty unless a stronger duty arises. That is to say, when two moral 
duties conflict one of the duties must be seen as having priority over the other. 
If we have to preserve two things, e.g. a self-conscious being and a non-
conscious being, the duty to preserve the self-conscious being has priority over 
the duty to preserve the non-conscious being.  
As Fieser points out, Callicott has offered an analogy for understanding 
the relative strengths of our biotic and individualistic duties: 
 “ ...as a general rule, the duties correlative to the inner social circles to 
which we belong, eclipse those correlatives to the rings farther from the 
heartwood when conflicts arise”.TP92PT  
 There are, according to Callicott, two kinds of duties: the inner and 
outer rings of duties. By the inner ring of duties, Callicott means family duties, 
and by outer duties, he means duties to friends. When we succeed in our 
family duties, then we can involve the community, the country, the world 
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community, and finally the biotic community. Each category of duties has 
distinct boundaries so that our social duties are not simply a subset of our 
environmental duties. Hence, the inner obligation outweighs the outer 
obligations. The priority of prima facie duties begins with personal and family 
duties as the strongest, and ends with environmental duties as the weakest. 
According to this priority order, the stranded mountain climber’s dilemma is 
resolved by giving priority to his duty of self-preservation. Fieser argues that 
the problem with Callicott’s suggestion is that many of our outer duties in fact 
outweigh our inner duties. In other words, the land ethic entails too many 
outer duties; we have no room for our inner duties if we have to meet all of the 
outer duties. Suppose, for example, I am a poor parent from a poor country 
where the cost of educating one’s children is prohibitive. If I cannot legally 
acquire the money to pay for my child’s education (and no alternative means of 
education is available), I would not be justified in raising money illegally, such 
as by being a paid assassin. In this case, my middle-core duty to society would 
outweigh my inner-core duty to educate my child. Similarly, in some 
circumstances, our outer core environmental duties outweigh our middle-core 
duty to neighbors. For example, suppose my airplane is out of fuel and I must 
choose between crashing into and destroying either an endangered plant 
species or a dog as a subject-of-a-life. My greater duty is to save the 
endangered plant species; it cannot be established that all inner core human 
duties outweigh all outer core environmental duties.  The duty to provide my 
family does not entitle me to kill animals, which are self-conscious or fell down 
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plant species, which are endangered. At this point, the boundaries between the 
various rings of obligation seem to break down. 
How much protection does environmental value provide for the 
interests of individuals? The answer will depend on how one understands the 
relation of individuals to the whole.  This point can be brought out by Aldo 
Leopold’s formulation of an ecological criterion of what is morally right: A act 
is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the 
biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise. It is often said in 
philosophy that “ought” implies “can.” It describes a claim that an individual 
as a moral person cannot be morally obligated to do something that is 
impossible for him to do. If we assume that the land ethic is deontological, it is 
simply unreasonable to expect humans to live by it.  If every action we take 
must satisfy the requirement of “tending to preserve the integrity, stability, and 
beauty of the biotic community,” we would never do anything.  
Nonhumans and humans must take and use resources from the biotic 
community in some way during our lifespan. If there is one issue, on which 
animal welfarists and environmentalists should speak with a single voice, it is 
that nonhuman animals should survive in the natural environment. Regan 
appears to have recognized this. We can be sentientist with respect to the 
source of animal rights, but we do not say that non-sentient entities, e.g. plants, 
species and ecosystem are not essential to preserve indirectly.   Creatures who 
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can suffer, take pleasure in their experiences, and whose lives go better or 
worse from their own point of view, require the environment to survive.   
 We do something beneficial for nonhuman animals when we preserve 
their environment, which requires much more of us.  Not just refraining from 
harming them; preserving their survival habitats would be a positive obligation 
to benefit them. Failure to protect their environment involves failures to protect 
animal rights.   
Furthermore, I point out that our moral consciousness is inevitably 
involved in constituting the perceived “inherent” values of nonhuman animals.  
It is important to stress human moral reflectivity in order to address the 
interrelated environmental issues. Callicott also recognizes this, and therefore 
he raises a wake up call on getting animals “back together again”.TP93PT Animals 
cannot have value, apart from their natural environment, and a natural 
environment is valued by its animal context. Therefore, animal welfare and the 
environment are interrelated. For example, the Sunderban an ecologically 
balanced forest of Bangladesh, is famous for its main property, the Royal 
Bengal tiger. By human activities, the Bengal tigers are going to be extinct. In 
this way, if animals lose their natural environment, one day we will have no 
aesthetic appreciation of nature. Therefore, we need to make a collective effort 
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to reflexively examine the existing ethical norms, and to explore the 
possibilities of establishing new ethical norms within our moral community.    
In this way, I find it much more plausible to assume that the protection 
of the environment does not involve a direct duty. Rather we have an indirect 
duty to protect the environment because of its relationships to both humans 
and animals.  I suppose that there are other factors, which determine the 
strength of this indirect duty toward the environment. These factors should be 
listed separately, and not as determinants of the inherent value of the 
environment. When we are in a situation where we cannot avoid causing harm 
to individuals, we have a choice of what would protect the rights of 
individuals.    We may ask: 
• What kind of interests does the subject-of-a-life have? 
• What do subjects-of-a-life need for their flourishing?  
• Is any species of animal endangered? 
• If any animal species is endangered, what is needed to protect it? 
  If we inquire into these questions, we may have a better basis for 
assessing the weight of our direct duties toward nonhuman animals affected. If 
we cannot avoid using their survival resources from a particular environment 
in which animals flourish, it may help us to choose the action which urges us to 
use the least resources so that nonhuman animals would survive with their 
habitats, and would flourish.  
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4.3 SUMMARY 
I believe that a reconciliation between animal welfarists and 
environmental ethicists is possible. 
 The issues that directly concern animals are obviously of great 
environmental import as well. According to animal welfarists (Singer, Regan 
et.al), we have an obligation to protect individual animals who are self-aware 
or sentient, and consciously strive for many things like us. The lives of animals 
go better or worse from their own point of view and they require the 
environment to survive. Preserving their survival habitats would be a positive 
obligation to benefit them. For animal welfarists, non-conscious entities are 
neither subject-of-a-life nor sentient, but are useful in giving pleasure or 
preference-satisfactions to individuals. That means, animal welfarists argue 
against broadening the class of beings with moral standing beyond sentient 
beings or subjects-of-a-life because they are incapable of desiring something 
consciously.  In addition, animals are dependent upon humans’ putting an end 
to the destruction of natural habitats, or on humans’ restraint.   
An environmentalist, Callicott develops an account of “nested 
communities”TP94PT that reflect our degree of relationship to various beings and 
                                                 
TP
94
PT . J. Baird Callicott, “Animal Liberation and Environmental Ethics: Back Together 




thereby provide the basis for our moral obligations. According to Callicott, we 
have the greatest moral obligations to those closest to us--to our immediate 
family--and gradually lesser obligations to those in our more distant 
communities, such as our neighbors, our fellow citizens, human beings and 
animals in general. These obligations are derived not from any kind of social 
contract or trust established between humans and animals, but from the 
importance of protecting the biotic community. Callicott’s position seems to be 
supported by Rolston who insists that humans have an obligation to ensure 
that ecosystems’ flourish. Only humans can take the responsibility to protect 
animals and their habitats from being harmed. Neither animal welfarists nor 
environmentalists are of one mind on many practical issues. We are in the 
midst of a transition to a culture that sees the importance of living in harmony 
with nature. What is important to recognize now is that animal welfarists and 









In this thesis, I have raised the question about whom or what can have  
moral standing or rights, and argued for an answer on  animal rights, which 
extends moral standing from human beings to all subjects-of-a-life.  I have tried 
to show that the rights of nonhuman animals should extend to the protection of 
their survival habitats. Thus, my thesis relates animal rights to their survival 
habitats. If this extension is accepted, individual nonhuman animals will be 
upgraded from being mere objects to being moral subjects-of-a-life like 
ourselves; of course, they will not be responsible to act like rational humans. 
While they are not able to act like us, they are like us in some relevant respects, 
and we cannot use them merely for our own purposes. Besides this, we need to 
preserve their survival interests so that they can develop and flourish in their 
natural environment.  
I have tried to outline the utilitarian and right-based views, which give 
animals’ moral standing. When we commit to one view or the other, we risk 
losing sight of what is valuable in opposing views.  For example, 
anthropocentrism, as the view that only humans have inherent value, implies 
that anything nonhuman must have merely instrumental value at best. 
However, that was not a serious moral theory regarding others’ survival 
interests.  No one should deny that a wider range of animals is intrinsically 
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valued. Hence, as an alternative approach to anthropocentrism, “nonhumans 
cannot be treated as a mere means to some other ends”.TP95PT  
But this alternative is rejected by a number of moral philosophers 
categorically because they believe that there are important values inherent in 
nature.  Each and everything in the biotic community has moral standing or 
rights. Leopold and Callicott are opposed to both Singer’s and Regan’s views, 
and they argue against the view that individual humans and nonhumans are 
the only kinds of beings with moral standing. 
The most serious environmental issues concern not the suffering of 
individual animals, and certainly not respect for individual plants, but rather 
the preservation of species and whole ecosystems: in a word, the environment. 
Clearly, holism and individualism are real options. Those who seek to 
understand the world and their place in it should take each seriously. The 
genuine division between individualists and holists, the issue that leaves us 
with serious thinkers on each side, is the question of whether (or which) 
nonhumans command respect in the same way (if not to the same degree) that 
self-aware moral humans do. The strongest of these is the one proposed by 
animal rights ethics, which assumes that a thesis is morally valid and binding 
insofar as it has its source in a certain kind of universal rational consensus.  
We are human, of course, and therefore our values are human values. 
That is, our values necessarily are the values of human subjects. Of course, no 
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human subjects can claim that they can survive without affecting the interests 
of nonhuman animals or the environment. It is certain that both humans and 
nonhumans have interests in the environment. Hence, without preserving our 
environment, we cannot meet our survival interests.   
We have a choice. Should we be individualists or holists, and should we 
be nonanthropocentric? However these debates are resolved, though, the fact 
remains that there is much to be gained from cultivating greater appreciation of 
nature. Simply appreciating nature, appreciating it for its own sake, treating it 
with respect is how most of us begin to develop an environmental ethic. 
Whether I do this or not, depends on what kind of respect we wish to have to 
preserve everyone’s interests. Singer and Regan, Leopold and Callicott, all hold 
that at least nonhuman living beings have moral standing, and oppose 
anthropocentrism in all its forms, which holds that all, and only human beings 
have moral standing.  
All of these views are versions of “Nonanthropocentrism”. This 
perspective believes that moral standing should extend beyond 
humans/persons, even though humans have distinctive traits, which the 
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